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INTRODUCTION

In 1903, Panama ceded its sovereign rights over the Panama Canal to the
United States in perpetuity. I The 1930 London Naval Treaty required
submarines to comply with the contemporary law of war, including the
prohibition on neutralizing enemy merchant vessels without having first
ensured the safety of their passengers and crew. 2 In 1945, the United Nations
Charter prohibited its members from threatening or using force against another
state, save for two limited exceptions. 3 And, in 1969, Spain and Morocco
concluded a permanent fisheries convention, setting the limit of their territorial
seas at twelve miles. 4
Some of these treaties were bilateral agreements between two states;
some were limited multilateral arrangements clarifying the legal rights and
duties of a few states; some were general multilateral agreements aspiring to
universal participation. Some were meant to be temporary descriptions of the
states' respective legal duties; others were intended to be permanent. Some
were concluded before the U.N. Charter restructured the international legal
order; some afterward---one is the U.N. Charter itself. Their subject matter
spans such diverse areas as trade law, the law of armed conflict, and the law of
the sea. But for all of their diversity in structure, parties, subject matter, and
dates, these treaties have one trait in common: they all include provisions that
are difficult to square with subsequent state action. However, this conflicting
state action is not critiqued as unlawful; rather, it is accepted and thus
apparently acceptable.
Treaties have always had to reconcile two competing interests: stability
and flexibility. 5 The need for stability in treaty regimes, reflected in the
I.
Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal to Correct the Waters of the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans arts. II-Ill, Pan-U.S. Nov. 18, 1903, 33 Stat. 2234 [hereinafter Hay-Bunau-Varilla
Treaty].
2.
Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament art. 22, Apr. 22, 1930, 46
Stat. 2858, 112 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter London Naval Treaty].
3.
U.N. Charter arts. 2, 42, 51.
4.
Convention sur la peche maritime entre le royaume du Marne et l'Espagne, MoroccoSpain, art. 3, Jan. 4, 1969, reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW
OF THE SEA 512, 513, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16 (U.N. Legislative Series 1974) [hereinafter
Morocco-Spain Fishery Agreement].
5.
Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International law,
49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 323, 353 (2008); see, e.g., Int'I Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of its Sixtieth
Session, Annex A ,i 1, U.N. Doc. N63/10 (2008).
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customary rule of pacta sunt servanda ("agreements must be kept"), undergirds
much of international law and explains states' willingness to invest energies in
concluding treaties. 6 However, treaty regimes that cannot accommodate the
shifting needs of states parties risk becoming irrelevant as circumstances and
customs change.
In recognition of this tension, scholars are devoting more time to
understanding the relationship between treaties and subsequent state action. 7 In
2008 the International Law Commission established a Study Group on
"Treaties over Time"-since renamed "Subsequent Agreements and
Subsequent Practice in Relation to Interpretation of Treaties"-to analyze how
subsequent state action affects treaties. 8 And much ink has been spilled
discussing individual treaty provisions now desperately in need of amendment
or proposing "adaptive interpretations"-interpretations not immediately
suggested by the treaty, but which attempt to reconcile outdated text with actual
(or desired) state action. 9
These efforts focus on traditional methods of treaty modification by
mutual consent: through amendment, supersession, and adaptive interpretation.
While these approaches are useful, they are also inadequate for addressing an
conflicts between treaty text and subsequent state conduct. Formal amendment
and treaty supersession require states parties' explicit and unanimous consent,
which will often be politically or practically infeasible to achieve in multilateral
treaty regimes. And while adaptive interpretations can resolve many
inconsistencies, words are not infinitely elastic. Situations invariably arise
where state party conduct cannot be aligned with any plausible reading of the
treaty text or when the tacit consent of other states parties cannot be assumed.
This Article highlights the possibility of modification by subsequently
developed customary international law as an alternative means of treaty
evolution.
·
As a matter of formal doctrine, treaty and customary international law are
coequal sources of a state's international legal obligations. ' 0 However, most
6.
Pac/a Sun/ Servanda, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
7.
See, e.g., TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE (Georg Nolte ed., 2013); Julian Arato,
Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional Transformation: Informal Change in International
Organizations, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 289, 294 (2013); Rahim Moloo, When Actions Speak Louder Than
Words: The Relevance of Subsequent Party Conduct to Treaty Interpretation, 31 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 39 (2013).
8.
lnt'l Law Comm'n, Summaries of the Work of the International Law Commission: Treaties
Over Time/Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Interpretation of Treaties,
http://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/l _11.shtml (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
9.
Adaptive interpretations are a broader category than "evolutive interpretations." Evolutive
interpretations are grounded on the states parties' original intent that a treaty provision evolve over time,
while adaptive interpretations encompass any reading that reconciles apparently contradictory state
conduct with a treaty's text. Cf Julian Arato, Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation:
Techniques a/Treaty Interpretation Over Time and Their Diverse Consequences, 9 LAW & PRAC. INT'L
CTS. & TRIBS. 443, 445 (2010) (defining "evolutive interpretation" as occurring when "the
developmental interpretation is based on some evidence of the original intention of the parties that the
treaty be capable of evolution"); see also Jnt'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth
Session, U.N. Doc A/61/10, at 415-16 & nn.1026-27 [hereinafter ILC Fragmentation Conclusions].
10. See infra note 273.
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international law scholars are consent theorists who believe that these legal
obligations are legitimate only to the extent states have consented to be bound
by them. 11 States explicitly consent to be bound by a treaty, but their consent to
customary international law (to the extent it exists) usually must be inferred. 12
Given that explicit consent is superior to tacit consent, consent theorists tend to
prioritize treaty law over customary international law. 13 And, for a host of
functional reasons, practitioners and judges tend to favor the lex scripta.
Between these theoretical and practical bents, most tend to presume that, where
the two sources require contradictory outcomes, treaty law will prevail.
This Article challenges that presumption by presenting situations where
customary international law has both lessened and expanded states' treaty
rights and obligations, thereby supporting the few scholars who have positedusually in purely theoretical works-that customary international law may
modify treaties. 14 By advancing a doctrinal justification for such modification
based on lex posterior, this Article also contributes to the growing literature
questioning whether the legitimacy of the binding nature of international legal
obligations can be grounded solely in state consent. 15 This argument is novel to
the extent that it presumes that general-rather than universal-acceptance of a
new customary rule may be sufficient to work a treaty modification, thereby
avoiding the holdout problem inherent to multilateral treaty modification under
the Vienna Convention's consent-focused rules (whereby a single state can
upset the consensus of the majority). 16
11. See Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 941 (2005)
( describing the "prevailing theory of validity in international law" as being based on "the classic
positivist idea that states are obliged to follow only those rules to which they assent" and noting that
such assent may be manifested "through words, or treaties, and deeds, or custom").
12. See, e.g., BRIERLY'S LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 49-50 (Andrew Clapham ed., 7th ed. 2012);
LOUIS HENKJN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 26-28 (1995).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 230-23 I.
14. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (2d ed. 2005); NANCY KONTOU,
THE TERMINATION AND REVISION OF TREATIES IN THE LIGHT OF NEW CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW 20 (1994); MARKE. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 58-59 (2d ed.
1997); Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
273, 275 (1974-75); Maarten Bos, The Hierarchy among the Recognized Manifestations ("Sources'') of
International Law, 25 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 334, 337 (1978). Nancy Kontou's book is a welcome
exception to purely theoretical works in that she discusses numerous examples of concrete conflicts
between treaty and customary international law obligations. Because Kontou subscribes to consent
theory, see KONTOU, supra, at 20, she and I draw different conclusions. Nonetheless, as evidenced from
citations, this Article is heavily indebted to her research.
15. See, e.g., BRIERLY, supra note 12, at 50-51; Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for
International Law, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2 (2013); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International
System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705, 710-11 (1988); Timothy Meyer, Collective Decision-Making in
International
Governance,
AJIL
UNBOUND
(Apr.
28,
2014,
3:05
PM),
https://www.asil.org/blogs/collective-decision-making-international-governance-agora-end-treaties
( citing scholars, himself included, who argue that the consent requirement for international law-making
has declined in importance); Joel P. Trachtman, Reports of the Death of Treaty are Premature, but
Customary International Law May Have Outlived Its Usefulness, AJIL UNBOUND (Apr. 29, 2014, 1 :50
PM), http://www.asil.org/blogs/reports-death-treaty-are-premature-customary-international-law-may-have
-outlived (noting that the consent requirement for treaties cannot be defended by references to
democracy or national autonomy).
16. Cf Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 529 (1993)
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Finally, this Article advances the counterintuitive argument that this less
consensual basis for treaty modification requires a state to engage in more
consensus-respecting conduct. When a state wishes to argue against a
traditional understanding of a treaty provision, the usual approach of adaptive
interpretation-attempting to reinterpret a treaty's text to permit an action
previously understood as forbidden-actually encourages states to act
unilaterally and risk destabilizing the international legal order. In contrast, a
state that bases its legal argument on the claim that the treaty has been modified
by subsequently developed customary international law will have to identify
and engage in coalition-building conduct.
Part I reviews how treaties were historically relatively flexible bilateral
agreements concluded against a stable background of default customary
international law. While foundational customary norms and bilateral
agreements are still the norm, today's international legal structure is
complicated by a proliferation in multilateral treaties and an increasing demand
for international regulation of new areas, technologies, objects, actions, and
ideas. In the absence of directly relevant treaty law, and in need of reliable
guiding principles, states are developing practices standardizing their rights and
duties in these new spheres. As a result, treaty text is increasingly running up
against conflicting state action and swiftly developing customary international
law. Part II describes consent-based means of modifying treaties and concludes
that these traditional methods do not legitimately resolve all conflicts between
treaty and later-in-time customary international law. Part III demonstrates that
the possibility of treaty modification by customary international law has long
existed in the international legal structure and evaluates different doctrinal
justifications for such modification. Part IV employs the threatened U.S.
unilateral use of force in Syria as a case study to tease out the relative benefits
and drawbacks of these different means of treaty modification.
I.

A NEW INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

Customary international law and treaty law are the two primary sources
of international legal obligations. Sometimes they operate independently,
governing particular fields; sometimes they serve as mutually reinforcing
regulations; sometimes one fills the other's lacunae; sometimes they mandate
apparently contradictory actions. As this Article is concerned with how
customary international may modify treaties, this Part traces how, due to
ideological, geopolitical, and technological developments, the relationship
between these two sources of international legal obligations has grown more
complicated and more prone to conflict.

(arguing that modem problems require "new rules that are binding on all subjects of international law
regardless of the attitude of any particular state" to avoid "an exempted recalcitrant state [from acting] as
a spoiler for the entire international community").
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The Classic Account
1.

Stable Customary International Law

A rule of customary international law is recognized as ex1stmg when
states generally engage in specific actions (the "state practice" requirement)
and accept that those actions are obligatory or permitted (the "opinio Juris sive
necessitatis" element). Thus, unlike custom in many domestic legal systems,
which derives much of its authority from its long-standing nature, 17 customary
international law has no formal temporal requirement. 18 Instead, a rule of
customary international law is authoritative because states generally abide by it
in the belief that it is law. 19
That being said, because of the generalized state practice requirement,
customary international law was slow to develop in a world of limited
communication and sporadic technological advances. Accordingly, historic
customary international law comprised long-established, well-known, and
relatively fixed rules governing relations among all states. It regulated the
recognition of new states and state responsibilities; the exchange of diplomatic
counsels and their immunities; the conduct and resolution of wars; the creation,
interpretation, and termination of treaties; and other subjects associated with
state interaction. 20

2.

Flexible Treaties

Against this background of static customary norms, states concluded

17.

Black's Law Dictionary defines custom as "a practice that by its common adoption and

long, unvarying habit has come to have the force of law." Custom, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed.
2009) (emphasis added).
I 8. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (7th ed. 2008);
KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 & nn.30-31 (2d ed. 1993) (citing
sources).
19. Most agree that a treaty's authority-and thus its legitimacy as a source of binding legal
obligation-is grounded in states' explicit consent. Customary international law's authority, however, is
the subject of much academic controversy. The generally accepted view is that both treaties and
customary international law derive their normative force from the consent of states: states explicitly
consent to treaties, and tacitly consent to new customary international law. See supra note 12.
However, scholars are increasingly questioning the orthodoxy that international law must be
grounded in state consent to be legitimate. See supra note 15. As I agree that international law-and,
specifically, customary international law-need not be grounded in state consent, I assume for present
purposes that customary international law's authority derives from its two traditional elements-state
practice and opinio Juris sive necessitatis-and, by extension, from the fact that states treat customary
international law as binding legal obligations (likely because they are reasonable and useful solutions to
coordination problems). This necessarily circular reasoning has long plagued international law scholars,
especially as it will be exceedingly difficult to demonstrate that a state acted in a specific manner out of
a sense of legal obligation-both because the state comprises different components and because
customary international law arises out of convenient cooperative practices. However, states do abide by
customary rules, even when it is against their own immediate self-interest. See infra Part III.A.2
(discussing how Germany limited its use of submarines during WWI).
20. See WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 60-61
(1964) (describing customary international law as "the rules of co-existence"). Additionally, "special
custom" governs practices among discrete groups of states. See ANTHONY D 'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF
CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 234-35 (1971).
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bilateral treaties-written documents memorializing agreements between two
states21 ----clarifying their respective legal rights and duties. These treaties were
relatively flexible legal regimes: they could be modified or terminated with the
consent of states parties, 22 by the conclusion of a subsequent, conflicting treaty
between the same parties, 23 by the denunciation of one party after a material
breach by the other, 24 or by a fundamental change in circumstances or other
supervening event resulting in the impossibility of performing a promised legal
obligation. 25 Additionally, certain types of treaties-for example, commercial
or trading treaties or treaties of alliance-were generally presumed to allow for
unilateral denunciation. 26 Accordingly, treaties have long been celebrated as a
source of adaptive positive law that reflects states parties' needs.

B.

The Modern World

Today's international legal structure is far more complicated. Certain
customary rules still serve as background defaults governing many areas of
state interaction,27 and the majority of new treaties are still bilateral. But two
factors-the rise of multilateral treaties and swiftly developing customary
international law-have changed the dynamic between treaty and customary
international law, resulting in treaties sometimes being the fixed backdrop
against which new state practice and norms develop.

I.

Constitutive Treaties

The past century has seen a dramatic rise in multilateral treaties-treaties

21. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT].Many of my characterizations of bilateral treaties are equally applicable to limited
multilateral agreements-agreements between a limited number of states setting forth their specific
rigbts, duties, and obligations vis-a-vis each other. In contrast to constitutive multilateral treaties, these
limited multilateral agreements are more akin to contracts and do not aspire to universal participation.
22. See VCLT, supra note 21, arts. 39, 54. Although the Vienna Convention is a product of the
modem international legal order, most of its provisions regarding the modification, suspension, or
termination of treaties were grounded in existing, albeit confused, customary law. See Karl Zemanek,
Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, Introductory Note, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. OF
INT'L L. 1-3 (2009), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/vclt/vclt-e.pdf (discussing which articles were
codifications of the existing customary international law of treaties).
23. See VCLT, supra note 21, art. 59.
24. See id. art. 60.
25. See id. arts. 61, 62.
26. See, e.g., G. Fitzmaurice (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on the law of Treaties, Int'!
Law Comm'n 16, 22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/107 (Mar. 15, 1957).
Whether there ever was a customary right permitting states to unilaterally withdraw from or denounce
all treaties, however, is a subject of much debate. Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati,
Withdrawing.from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202,204 (2010), with Lea Brilmayer & Isaias
Yemane Tesfalidet, Treaty Denunciation and "Withdrawal" from Customary International law: An
Erroneous Analogy with Dangerous Consequences, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 217 (2011),
http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/forum/treaty-denunciation-and-qwithdrawalq-from-customary-intemational
-law-an-erroneous-analogy-with-dangerous-consequences.
27. See Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115,
116 n. l (2005) (noting that "the law of state responsibility, foreign direct investment, the jurisdiction to
apply law, diplomatic immunity, human rights, and state immunity" are currently "governed wholly or
partially" by customary international law).
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concluded by multiple countries that often aspire to universal participation. As
early as the 1920s, scholars were recognizing that there were "an increasing
number of multilateral treaties."28 According to one study, eighty-six
multilateral treaties were concluded in the century between 1648 through
1748-but more than two thousand such treaties were concluded in the twentyfive years between 1951 and 1975! 29 This proliferation might be traced to a
growing conviction that certain global problems-including combating the
training and financing of transnational terrorist organizations, minimizing
human-driven climate change, and reducing the development or use of weapons
of mass destruction-are best addressed through global solutions. 30
Whereas bilateral treaties resemble domestic contracts, multilateral
treaties often play a more constitutive role in the international legal structure,
usually by codifying norms or setting standards. Thus, they are often
characterized as "law-making" treaties.3 1 As Judge Alvarez noted with regard
to the Genocide Convention, certain multilateral treaties "have a universal
character; they are, in a sense, the Constitution of the international society, the
new international constitutional law." 32 The U.N. Charter in particular is often
analogized to-or even said to be-a global constitution. 33
Constitutive multilateral treaties are difficult to modify, and thus may not
reflect new needs of their constituents. 34 As traditionally understood, treaties
can be modified only with the consent of the states parties. Thus, as the number
of parties to a treaty increases, the likelihood of substantively altering its text
by mutual consent decreases exponentially. Additionally, many bilateral
strategies of inducing treaty modification are either ineffective or inapplicable
in the multilateral context. 35 The enduring quality of constitutive multilateral
treaties can be seen as a benefit: it underscores the binding strength of the treaty

28.

Quincy Wright, The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 95

(1929).
29. Charlotte Ku, Exec. Dir., Am. Soc'y of Int'! Law, Global Governance and the Changing
Face of International Law (June 16-18, 2001), in 2 ACAD. COUNCIL U.N. SYS. REP & PAPERS I, 5
(2001 ). Recently, however, multilateral treaty-making has declined; this may be because "the lowhanging fruit of international cooperation has been harvested." Trachtman, supra note 15.
30. Multilateral treaties are considered to be an ideal solution to these issues for a variety of
reasons. See Blum, supra note 5, at 363 ("[M]odern multilateral treaty-making could be viewed as more
participatory, more transparent, more democratized, and hence more legitimate than traditional bilateral
diplomacy."). But see id. at 358-60 ( questioning whether certain global problems might not be better
addressed through bilateral treaties or limited multilateral agreements).
31. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 654 (Ronald F. Roxburgh ed., 3d
ed. 1920).
32. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15, 51 (May 28) (Alvarez, J., dissenting); see also JAN
KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2009).
33. See, e.g., Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the
International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529 (1998); Blaine Sloan, The United Nations
Charter as a Constitution, I PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 61, 61-62 (1989).
34. U.S. constitutional law scholars will recognize this as the Article V problem. See WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
25 (2010).
35. See infra Part II.A-B.
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and justifies states' high initial investments during the drafting process.
However, as time passes and new customs and norms develop, these static texts
risk becoming outdated.
To some extent, careful crafting may lessen this problem. During the
treaty negotiations, states may employ a number of techniques to introduce
flexibility into the treaty regime, including building in procedures or routes by
which the treaty may be updated without threatening its overarching structure. 36
Drafters might also designate an authoritative interpreter of the treaty to resolve
future disputes regarding the text's meaning. 37 After the treaty has taken effect,
states may engage in other folll).S of lawmaking: they may propose gap-filling
adaptive interpretations,38 conclude related bilateral agreements, 39 or employ a
variety of soft law mechanisms to clarify their treaty rights or obligations. 40 But
these coping mechanisms do not solve the problem of subsequent state conduct
that directly contradicts treaty law---conduct that may swiftly develop into
contradictory customary international law.

2.

Contemporary Customary International Law

Due both to a need for new regulations and technological and political
developments that allow customary international law to develop swiftly, new
customary international law is now forming at an unprecedented rate.
First, technological and ideological advances have led to an escalating
need for international regulation over new areas, objects, practices, and ideasand the need for regulation is spurring the creation of new customary
international law. 41 New technology has opened previously inaccessible
regions-outer space, inhospitable deserts, and the deep sea bed-to
exploitation. Drones, cyber capabilities, and autonomous weapons systems are
challenging fundamental precepts of the law of armed conflict. 42 Entire new
fields of international law-international trade law, international human rights
36. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 76-77 (1991)
(discussing specific strategies); Brian Israel, Treaty Stasis, AJIL UNBOUND (May 8, 2014, 2:40 PM),
http://asil.org/blogs/treaty-stasis-agora-end-treaties.
3 7. See infra Part II.C.2.
38. See infra Part II.C.
39. Israel, supra note 36.
40. See id.; Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks: Twenty-First-Century International Lawmaking,
101 GEO. L.J. 725, 740-43 (2012) (discussing U.S. practices with regard to "nonlegal understandings,"
"layered cooperation," and "diplomatic law talk").
41. For example, customary international humanitarian law is flourishing. In response to the
proliferation of nonintemational armed conflicts, and in contrast to the pre-1990 legal order, "it is now
widely understood to exceed the scope of the [international humanitarian law] treaties." Monica Hakimi,
Custom's Method and Process: Lessons from Humanitarian Law, in CUSTOM'S FUTURE:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 148, 154 (2016). But see Joel P. Trachtman, The
Growing Obsolescence of Customary International Law, in CUSTOM'S FUTURE: INTERN AT!ONAL LAW
IN A CHANGING WORLD 172, 172 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016) (arguing that customary international
law cannot effectively address either longstanding or modem challenges to the international legal order).
42. See, e.g., Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 1837 (2015) [hereinafter Crootof, Killer Robots]; Rebecca Crootof, War Torts:
Accountability for Autonomous Weapons, 164 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016),
http://ssm.com/abstract=2657680.

246

THEY ALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 41: 237

law, and international criminal law-have sprung up, and legal fields once
deemed to be matters of domestic law-intellectual property, investment, and
environmental law-are increasingly seen as appropriately regulated by
international law.
In the absence of directly relevant treaty law, and in need of reliable
guiding principles, states are developing practices standardizing their rights and
duties in these new spheres. In most cases, states will justify their actions as
lawful under adaptive interpretations of broadly related treaty text. However,
existing treaty regimes may not address or anticipate the full range of
situations. For example, the majority of cyberattacks do not rise to the level of
an "armed attack" and are not governed by the law of armed conflict,43 and
other treaty regimes only partially regulate their many possible forms and
uses. 44 As state action in these ungoverned areas evolves and comes to be
understood as obligatory, it will harden into new customary international law
that might clarify or contradict existing treaty language. In some situations,
state action may emerge that is practically appropriate to the situation but might
appear to be in conflict with the relevant treaties. Such practice may initially be
considered unlawful, but as it is accepted by more and more states, it can
harden into subsequently developed customary international law.
Additionally, customary law may now form at a far faster rate. Whereas
information once traveled between states by foot, horse, or sail, the Internet and
other improved communication technologies now allow states to receive news
and react almost instantaneously to other states' actions. The greater
dissemination of information also makes it easier for policymakers to identify
evidence of state practice or opinio Juris sive necessitatis and thereby argue that
a given approach comports with an existing or developing custom. 45 Growing
global interdependence and mushrooming international institutions, which
foster information sharing and cooperation, have encouraged additional state
interactions-which, in tum, results in more evidence of state practice and
opinio Juris sive necessitatis. 46 Furthermore, states are no longer the only
international lawmakers: thanks in large part to technological developments, 47
both intrastate and nonstate actors are playing an increasingly influential role in
the creation of customary international law. 48
43. Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, Aileen Nowlan, William
Perdue & Julia Spiegel, The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 840 (2012).
44. Id. at 873.
45. Colin Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible Hand of
Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 198 (2001).
46. See Robert 0. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT' L
SEC. 39, 42 (1995).
47. Picker, supra note 45, at 197-201.
48. See, e.g., Hakimi, supra note 41; Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary
International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 119 (2007); W. Michael Reisman, Canute Confronts

the Tide: State Versus Tribunals and the Evolution of the Minimum Standard in Customary International
Law, 30 ICSID REV. 616, 619-21 (2015); Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by
Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation ofInternational Humanitarian Law, 3 7 YALE
J. INT'L L. 107 (2011). Indeed, some nonstate actors may be more influential than states, as they are not
perceived as advancing a nationalistic agenda. Hakimi, supra note 41, at 164.
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As a result of these technological and political developments, customary
international law can now develop relatively quickly. 49 The customary
international law of the sea, for instance, changed dramatically in the twentieth
century. Over the course of a few decades, the common understanding of where
a coastal state could exercise its sovereign right to exclude others from fishing
shifted from three, to twelve, to two hundred nautical miles from its shore. 50

*****
Historically, stable customary international law governed interactions
between all states, while treaties tended to be malleable bilateral agreements
regulating specific relations between two states parties. The proliferation of
multilateral treaties and the rise of swiftly developing customary international
law, however, have altered the international legal landscape. As constitutive
multilateral treaties are harder to modify, they risk obsolescence. In contrast, as
growing global interdependence and technological advancements allow for
increased state interaction, customary international law is developing at an
unprecedented rate and is increasingly likely to conflict with relatively static
treaty law.
II.

MODIFICATION BY MUTUAL CONSENT

Treaties largely derive their authority as sources of legal obligations from
state consent; accordingly, they may always be modified (or terminated) with
the consent of their states parties. After reviewing consent-based approaches to
treaty modification, this Part concludes that these traditional methods do not
legitimately settle all conflicts between treaty and later-in-time customary
international law.
Doctrinally, modification by consent may take various forms: formal
amendment, treaty supersession, or amplification by associated protocols. As
these methods require states parties' explicit consent, they are clearly legitimate
means of treaty modification. However, they are also the most difficult to effect
for multilateral treaty regimes, where a single state's refusal to consent may
thwart a much-needed alteration.
When modification by explicit mutual consent is not an option, adaptive
interpretations-interpretations not immediately suggested by the text of the
treaty but that attempt to reconcile its text with subsequent conflicting state
action-provide an alternative means of updating aging treaty text. But while
49. What I term "contemporary" customary international law still requires both evidence of
state practice and opinio juris sive necessitatis. It should be distinguished from what some scholars call
"modern" or "instant" customary international law, which is criticized for being less tied to state
practice. For a description of how "instant" custom may arise, see Bin Cheng, United Nations
Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. lNT'L L. 23, 45
(1965) ("International customary law requires only one single constitutive element, namely, the opinio
juris of States."), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEACHING AND PRACTICE 237, 260 (Bin Cheng
ed., 1982). For critiques of"modern" customary international law, see, for example, Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law As Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 839-40 (1997); Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human
Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 83 (1992).
50. See KONTOU, supra note 14, at 37-40.
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adaptive interpretation can resolve many inconsistencies, words are not
infinitely elastic. As new norms become widely accepted, certain inflexible
treaty obligations will appear progressively more absurd or impractical, and
proposed interpretations attempting to resolve discrepancies between treaty law
and state action will appear less plausible and convincing.

A. Formal Amendment
In 1991, the United States and Czechoslovakia signed a bilateral
investment treaty (BIT). 51 After Czechoslovakia was dissolved in 1993, the BIT
continued in effect for its successor states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
In 2004, after the Czech Republic became a member of the European Union, it
was required to take "all appropriate steps to eliminate incompatibilities
between the Treaty Establishing the European Community and its other
international agreements," including its BIT with the United States. 52
Accordingly, that same year the Czech Republic and the United States amended
their earlier BIT to reduce the possibility of conflicts between it and European
Union laws. 53
In 2001, states parties gathered for the Second Review Conference on the
Convention on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCCW), which
regulates the use of certain weapons in international armed conflicts. 54 Based
on a U.S. proposal, the states parties agreed to amend Article 1 of the
framework Convention to make it and the (then-existing) first four associated
protocols equally applicable to noninternational armed conflicts. 55 No state
opposed this extension of the treaties' scope, largely in recognition of the fact
that the extension of the law of war to noninternational armed conflicts was "an
important and necessary development of international humanitarian law. " 56
Ideally, any necessary treaty modifications would be similarly addressed

51. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Oct. 22, 1991, Czech. &
Slovk.-US., S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-31.
52. Additional Protocol Between the United States of America and the Czech Republic to the
Treaty between the United States of America and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Concerning
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment of October 22, 1991, pmbl., Czech. &
Slovk.-U.S., Dec. 10, 2003, S. TREATY DOC. No. 108-18 (2004).
53. See id.
54. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-25, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137. This framework Convention is augmented by five
protocols, governing the use of weapons causing injury by fragments not detectable by X-ray; mines,
booby-traps, and other such devices; incendiary weapons; blinding laser weaponry; and weaponry with
explosive remnants of war.
55. Amendment to Article I of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Dec. 21, 2001, S. TREATY Doc. No. 109-10, 2260 U.N.T.S. 82. The Fifth
Protocol, which was concluded in 2003 and took effect in 2006, applies to both international and
noninternational armed conflicts, in accordance with the amended Article 1. See Protocol on Explosive
Remnants of War, Nov. 28, 2003, S. TREATY Doc. No. 109-10 (2006).
56. Louis Maresca, Second Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 255, 256 {2002).
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by the states parties through the treaty's formal provisions for amendment.
Modem treaties often have sections detailing their amendment procedures; in
the absence of such a provision, the general rule is that treaties may be
amended if all states parties so agree. 57 However, for a variety of reasons, this
will be more difficult to effect in a multilateral than in a bilateral treaty regime.
First, two states will be more likely to agree to a treaty modification than
will numerous states. Moreover, a state wishing to modify a bilateral agreement
has far greater power over its treaty partner than a state wishing to modify a
multilateral treaty. Because a state can threaten to breach (and thereby possibly
terminate) a bilateral agreement, it can coerce its partner to agree to certain
modifications. As in domestic contractual law, there will be situations where
the nonbreaching party would prefer a modified performance to
nonperformance and therefore will assent to altering the original agreement.
This threat carries less weight in multilateral situations, as one party's breach
will rarely threaten the existence of the treaty regime. 58
Second, it is perhaps obvious to observe that multiple states will be more
likely to agree on insignificant changes than on significant ones. Although the
U.N. Charter is widely criticized as imperfect, 59 after almost seventy years of
existence and dramatic shifts in the international order, it has been formally
amended only five times-and each modification was a relatively minor one,
required by the significant growth in U.N. membership. 60 Nor are even the
most mundane proposals for amendments easily passed. States, revaluating
their interests, may hold up necessary alterations in the hopes of renegotiating
· "fi1cant pomts.
·
61
oth er, more s1gm
Additionally, multiple states are more likely to agree on changes
reflecting well-established norms than on more controversial ones. For
example, the CCCW states parties were able to agree on amending Article 1 in
large part because the norms prohibiting the use of excessively injurious
weapons or weapons with indiscriminate effects have become so well
entrenched. But even well-established norms are rarely universally accepted:
although no state formally opposed Article I amendment to the CCCW, only 82

57. See VCLT, supra note 21, arts. 39-40.
58. See Laurence R. Helfer, Terminating Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 634,
635 & n.7 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012) (discussing exceptions to this general rule, such as when the
multilateral agreement specifies that it will not remain in force should the member states drop below a
specified number).
59. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Rep.
of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. N59l565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
60. In 1965, the Security Council was increased from eleven to fifteen members and the
required supermajority for affirmative decisions was increased from seven to nine votes. The same year,
the U.N. Economic and Social Council was increased from eighteen to twenty-seven members. In 1968,
Article I 09 was amended to account for the earlier modification to the required supermajority vote.
Finally, in 1973, the U.N. Economic and Social Council was increased again, this time to fifty-four
members.
Charter of the
United Nations, Introductory
Note,
UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/introductory-note/index.html (July 28, 2014).
61. Israel, supra note 36.
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of the 122 states parties have adopted it. 62 Forty countries-including Israel,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela----do not recognize
the applicability of the CCCW and its protocols to internal armed conflicts. 63
Finally, precisely because they create beneficial constitutive law, states
may be reluctant to amend multilateral treaties. Amendment risks
fragmentation, insofar as some states and not others might agree to the
alteration. As "[t]he move from a single set of rules for a given domain to
different rules in force between different States may diminish the stability,
clarity, and gravitational pull of the regime," 64 states reliant on the original
treaty may not wish to improve it, given that doing so risks undermining its
overall force.

B.

Treaty Supersession and Additional Protocols

Changes in state action led to the customary international law of the sea
evolving swiftly in the twentieth century. In the 1700s, a coastal state's
territorial sea was considered to be three nautical miles from its shore-roughly
the distance a canon could fire. In this zone, states could exercise traditional
sovereign rights, including the power to exclude other nationals from fishing;
beyond was the high seas, open for exploitation to nationals of any state. 65
During the twentieth century, however, states increasingly claimed exclusive
fishing rights in areas beyond the three-mile limit, usually citing the need to
conserve or avoid overexploiting their fishery resources. On the basis of this
evolving state action, in 1974 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that
states enjoyed a twelve-mile exclusive fishery zone under customary
international law. 66 Less than a decade later, the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention provided for a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, within which the
coastal state had an exclusive exploitation right, at least up to its capacity to
harvest. 67 Shortly thereafter, the ICJ recognized the 200-mile zone as a new
rule of customary international law, binding on all states (including those that
did not join the Convention). 68
This evolving customary international law affected numerous fishery
62. Compare Amendment to Article I of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src
=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-2-c&chapter=26&lang=en (last visited Mar. 30, 2016), with Convention
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties. un.org/pagesN iewDetails.aspx?src=TREA TY &mtdsg_no=XXVI-2&chapter=26&lang=
en (last visited Mar. 30, 20 I 6).
63. See sources cited in supra note 62.
64. Israel, supra note 36.
65. See AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (7th rev. ed.
1997).
66. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 3, ,i 52 (July 25).
67. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 57, 62(2), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
68. Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), Judgment, I 982 I.C.J. 18, ,i I 00 (Feb. 24) (observing
that the 200-mile exclusive economic zone "may be regarded as part of modem international law").
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treaties. For example, based on a 1904 Convention with Great Britain, France
enjoyed the right to fish in certain Canadian territorial waters. 69 In recognition
of France's historic fishing rights, Canada exempted France from its 1964
Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, 70 which claimed a territorial sea of three
nautical miles and an additional exclusive fishing zone extending for another
twelve nautical miles. 71 However, in 1972, in recognition of the changed
customary law, Canada and France signed a new agreement phasing out French
fishing rights. 72
If states conclude a treaty that directly contradicts an earlier treaty
between the same parties, the conflicting provisions in the earlier agreement are
considered terminated. 73 This practice of law invalidation by subsequent law is
called supersession, and it provides an alternative means of modifying both
bilateral and multilateral treaties by mutual consent. However, for much the
same reasons discussed with regard to formal amendment procedures, treaty
modification through supersession is far more effective in bilateral than in
multilateral treaty regimes. Traditional methods of pressuring treaty partners
into altering their legal obligations are less effective, multiple states are
unlikely to agree on needed substantive changes, and augmentation risks• 74
fr agrnentatlon.
States have attempted to address the difficulty of modifying multilateral
treaties by mutual consent through a practice that is distinct from, but related
to, supersession. Instead of concluding a contradictory treaty, states in an
overly broad or aging multilateral regime may create additional augmenting or
amplifying agreements, often termed "Protocols." A state may ratify the
original agreement, the additional protocols, both, or neither.
One benefit associated with the possibility of superseding protocols is
that states negotiating a multilateral agreement may table the most controversial
questions for a later date. States may conclude a relatively low-cost and
nonthreatening framework treaty, which in tum may encourage awareness of
the issue and the evolution of pertinent norms. As those norms evolve over time
and become clarified or more established, they can provide greater support for
subsequent protocols than existed when the original agreement was drafted. 75
However, by putting off certain controversial decisions in the interest of
69. Convention Between Great Britain and France, Respecting Newfoundland, and West and
Central Africa, Fr.-Gr. Brit., Apr. 8, 1904, reprinted in 97 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 31
(1903-1904); see also KONTOU, supra note 14, at 51-54 (describing the evolution of Canada's fishing
agreements with France).
70. Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, C. Gaz., pt. II, vol. 98, SOR/1964-275, P.C. 1964-1112,
Aug_ 12, 1964 (Can_), reprinted in 3 l.L.M. 925_
71. Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, R.S.C. 1964, c 22, §§ 3(1), 4(1) (Can_), reprinted in
3 I.L.M. 922.
72. Agreement Between Canada and France on Their Mutual Fishing Relations, Can.-U_S.,
Mar. 27, 1972, reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE
SEA, supra note 4, at 570.
73. VCL T, supra note 21, art. 59.
74. See supra Part II.A.
75. Cf Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 42, at 1898 (arguing that autonomous weapon
systems should be regulated through a framework convention).
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widespread ratification, states may engage in "buck passing" and conclude
toothless agreements. Thus, "in some ways [the use of protocols] only puts a
different name to a familiar problem," as attempting modification through
either treaty supersession or amplifying protocols is effective only to the extent
that all states parties to the original treaty ratify the subsequent agreement. 76
C. Adaptive Interpretation

Because they aim to appeal to all states and must accommodate varied
interests, multilateral treaties usually employ broad language and set
generalized standards rather than specific rules. 77 As a result, the expansive
provisions that typify multilateral treaty agreements are more amenable to
imaginative interpretation than those found in relatively concrete bilateral
treaties. 78 Adaptive interpretations-interpretations not immediately suggested
by the treaty, but which attempt to reconcile outdated text with actual (or
sometimes desired) state action-are doctrinally legitimate to the extent that all
states parties explicitly or implicitly accept them, which will usually depend on
whether or not the proposed interpretation is in keeping with the multilateral
treaty's object and purpose. 79 State acceptance may be manifested in a variety
of ways: in written instruments; by subsequent state party conduct; or even, in
certain circumstances, by silence.
Adaptive interpretation is fundamentally distinct from other forms of
consent-based modification in two ways. First, the consent to new adaptive
interpretations need not be explicit. In multilateral regimes, consent is often
inferred from the actions or even the inaction of states parties. However, this
can be problematic, as states' silence may not signal consent. Second, unlike
amendment or supersession, adaptive interpretation does not purport to alter
states parties' legal rights or obligations, but merely to clarify them or fill gaps
in the existing law. However, the line between interpretation and modification
is a thin one, and one that may shift with the interpreter.

I.

"Living Treaties" and Teleological Interpretation

There are three primary schools of thought on treaty interpretation: the
"textual" or "ordinary meaning of the words" school, the "intentions of the
parties" school, and the "teleological" or "aims and objects" school. 80 Article

76. Blum, supra note 5, at 353.
77. Id. at 350.
78. See HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS, at xiv-xv (9th prtg. 2000) ("That the law is open to more than one
interpretation is certainly detrimental to legal security; but it has the advantage of making the law
adaptable to changing circumstances, without the requirement of formal alteration."). Parties to bilateral
agreements may have less need for adaptive interpretation, as two states, as opposed to multiple states,
are better able to address likely complications before they arise or amend or supersede the treaty
afterwards.
79. See supra note 9 (distinguishing adaptive interpretation from evolutive interpretation).
80. See Int'] Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/6309/Rev. l, at 218 (1966) [hereinafter ILC Report].
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31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides the
general rules of treaty interpretation, attempts to integrate all three. It provides:
"A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose." 81
The textual approach is not ideal in multilateral regimes, as words never
have a truly unambiguous meaning. Claiming they do merely "veil[s] the
process whereby a person, a court, or another body reaches a certain conclusion
which inclines them to regard a particular meaning as the natural and plain
meaning of a given word." 82 Additionally, as the number of states parties to the
treaty regime grows, the likelihood that they agree upon the meanings of
controversial words lessens.
Furthermore, while the original intentions of the parties may be highly
relevant in the construction of bilateral, contract-like agreements, original
intentions are less relevant in interpreting multilateral treaties. Given the sheer
number of parties, it is impossible to establish their original intent. 83
Furthermore, as states regularly accede to multilateral agreements long after the
treaty originally took effect, they "can not be supposed to have accepted
interpretations suggested in the preliminary conversations of the original
negotiators." 84
Accordingly, while the "textual" or "original intent" methodologies may
be appropriate or even preferable in bilateral treaty construction, the "aims and
object" approach is most sensibly applied to the interpretation of constitutive,
multilateral treaties. 85 Such law-making treaties should not be understood as
static, dead contracts-rather, they are living texts, so interpreting them
adaptively, in light of their objects and purposes, is the best way to maintain
their continued relevance. 86 Recognizing the usefulness of evolutive
interpretation, states negotiating a treaty sometimes intend for its provisions to
be interpreted dynamically. 87 The U.N. Charter, for example, was always
intended to be a living instrument. 88
81. VCLT, supra note 21, art. 31(1).
82. Pollux, The Interpretation of the Charter, 23 BRJT. Y.B. lNT'L L. 54, 67 (1946) ("Pollux"
is a pseudonym used by Edvard Hambro); see also KELSEN, supra note 78, at xiv; Myres S. McDougal
& Richard N. Gardner, The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival, 60 YALE L.J. 258,264
(1951).
83. Pollux, supra note 82, at 70; see also McDougal & Gardner, supra note 82, at 264-65.
84. Wright, supra note 28, at I 04. The U.N. Charter, for example, was originally concluded by
fifty states, but its members now number nearly two hundred.
85. See, e.g., McDougal & Gardner, supra note 82, at 266-69 (citing sources); Sloan, supra
note 33, at I 05-06, 111.
86. The European Court of Human Rights has adopted perhaps the broadest understanding of
this approach in its interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights. It considers the
Convention "a living instrument which ... must be interpreted in light of present-day conditions." Tyrer
v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ,r 31 (1978).
87. See, e.g., Arato, supra note 9 (discussing approaches to treaty interpretation based on the
original and subsequent intent of states parties).
88. See, e.g., Pollux, supra note 82, at 54 ("The Charter, like every written Constitution, will
be a living instrument."); Sloan, supra note 33, at 118 (quoting John Foster Dulles as stating, "What is
needed is a principle that is sufficiently basic to guide the organization through the many years to come,
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The usefulness of teleological interpretation of constitutive treaties is
evidenced by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which protects a state's "inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs," at least
"until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security." 89 Under the textual approach, a state could
act in lawful self-defense under the Charter only after an armed attack
occurred-to read the provision otherwise would be to read "if an armed attack
occurs" as superfluous. Under the intent of the parties school, the Charter
apparently codified a right which was governed in 1945 by the Caroline
standard: A state might act in anticipatory self-defense-which is to say, before
an armed attack occurred-but only if an attack was imminently threatened and
was "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation." 90 Instead, Article 51 has been interpreted to exist alongside a
customary-and thus changing-right to self-defense.91 As a result, the
definition of an imminent attack justifying the anticipatory responsive use of
force has been able to evolve in tandem with new developments in warfare and
weaponry.
The problem with teleological interpretations is, of course, that one
interpreter's understanding of a treaty's goals may differ starkly from
another's-as evidenced by the ongoing debate over what level of imminence
is required for lawful, anticipatory defensive uses of force. 92 This is further
complicated by the fact that any given treaty will have multiple goals. The U.N.
Charter, for example, lists four express purposes for the United Nations: "[t]o
maintain international peace and security" through a variety of measures,
including settling disputes between states "in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law"; "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples"; "[t]o achieve international co-operation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"; and
"[t]o be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of
these common ends." 93 While common themes underlie these purposes, they
will sometimes come into conflict. Is maintaining regional peace more
and to permit of evolution according to what may, during those years, be the developing ideas and
changing conditions of the world community"); Oscar Schachter, Book Review, 60 YALE L.J. 189, 193
(1951) ("The Charter ... is a constitutional instrument whose broad phrases were designed to meet
changing circumstances for an undefined future.").
89. U.N. Charter, supra note 3, art. 51.
90. Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Lord Ashburton, British Foreign
Secretary (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in 2 MOORE DIGEST 412 (1906).
91. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.CJ. Rep. 14, "Iii 174-80 (June 27).
92. See, e.g., Howard A. Wachtel, Note, Targeting Osama Bin Laden: Examining the Legality
of Assassination as a Tool of U.S. Force, 55 DUKE L.J. 677, 690 (2005) (describing three U.S.
interpretations of "self-defense" under Article 51 ).
93. U.N. Charter art. I. Nor are these all of the goals-the preamble lists many more, and
various articles clarify how these goals may and may not be attained.
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important than promoting certain human rights? What about when the
"principles of justice" and "international law" are at odds? Accordingly, while
an interpreter should approach the construction of multilateral treaties from a
teleological stance, any given interpretation will be legitimate and successful
only to the extent it reflects the agreement of the states parties-the subject of
the next subsection.

2.

The Importance of the Audience

While the success of any new interpretation of a text depends on how
well or badly it is received, 94 this is all the more true in the international sphere.
In domestic law, sometimes-improbable interpretations of a text might
nonetheless enjoy the seal of an authoritative interpreter, and therefore be
accepted as legitimate (if poorly reasoned). As there will often be no designated
treaty interpreter, 95 however, the legitimacy of a new interpretation depends on
whether the audience-the other treaty partners, which in multilateral
conventions can include the entire international community-accepts it. As a
result, it is more difficult for expansive or controversial interpretations to be
accepted in the international legal order.
In determining whether a given construction is legitimate, interpreters are
to consider "[t]he context" of the treaty, which includes the treaty's text and
agreements or instruments relating to the treaty made or accepted by all states
parties; 96 "[a]ny subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions";97 "[ a ]ny
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation"; 98 and "[a]ny relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties."99
There is no hierarchy among these interpretative tools: "All the various
elements, as they were present in any given case, [should] be thrown into the
crucible, and their interaction [should] give the legally relevant

94. Cf J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music: Performance Notes on
"The Banjo Serenader" and "The lying Crowd of Jews," 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513, 1519-20 (1999)
(discussing the role of the audience in determining whether an interpretation of a text is "authentic or
faithful").
95. See Pollux, supra note 82 (discussing which entity has the authority to interpret the U.N.
Charter). In certain cases, a treaty will designate an authoritative interpreter. For example, the World
Trade Organization Agreement provides that the Ministerial Conference and the General Council "have
the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations" of the Agreement for all states parties. Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. IX(2), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154,
159. Attempting to distinguish between interpretation and modification, the article continues: "The
decision to adopt an interpretation . . . shall not be used in a manner that would undermine the
amendment provisions ... ."Id.When an authoritative interpreter advances an adaptive interpretation of
a treaty, there is less need for states to then consent to it: by designating an interpreter, states parties
essentially give ex ante consent to be bound by that interpreter's readings.
96. VCL T, supra note 21, art. 31 (2).
97. Id. art. 31 (3)(a).
98. Id. art. 31 (3)(b).
99. Id. art. 31(3)(c).
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interpretation." 100 While some tribunals have implied that treaty text is superior
to subsequent practice or other relevant rules of international law, 101 the only
hierarchy is between the aforementioned primary ones and "the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion," which are
"supplementary means of interpretation." 102
In keeping with treaty law's grounding in state consent, a crucial element
for all but the last of the primary considerations is the states parties' agreement.
Instruments must be accepted by all parties as related to the treaty, subsequent
agreements relating to the interpretation or application of the treaties must be
made between the parties, and subsequent practice is relevant only insofar as it
"establishes the agreement of the parties regarding [the treaty's]
interpretation." 103 The importance of general acceptance of new interpretations
by all states parties was reiterated at the 1945 U.N. Conference on International
Organization in a statement regarding the construction of the Charter. While
noting that each Charter organ (the General Assembly, the Security Council,
the ICJ, etc.) had the authority to interpret different Charter provisions as
"applicable to its particular functions," the statement clarified "that if an
interpretation made by any organ of the Organization or by a committee of
jurists is not generally acceptable it will be without binding force." 104
Ex ante or ex post state party consent is necessary to establish the
legitimacy, and thus success, of a new interpretation. 105 Such consent will be
easy enough to establish when states have designated an authoritative
interpreter, have made or accepted instruments relevant to the interpretation of
the treaty, or have concluded agreements regarding the treaty's meaning or
application. But, especially in multilateral regimes without designated
interpreters, states parties will rarely explicitly affirm a new construction of a
text-instead, they may do nothing at all. When does state silence actually
signal tacit consent?

3.

When State Party Conduct Becomes Subsequent Practice

Article 27(3) of the U.N. Charter provides that Security Council decisions
on nonprocedural matters "shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members." 106
Scholars were quick to debate the meaning of this provision. Some concluded
that it was "unambiguous" and clearly required the presence and concurring
vote of all five permanent members for the Security Council to pass a valid

100. ILC Report, supra note 80, at 219-20.
101. See Moloo, supra note 7, at 43 (providing examples).
102. VCL T, supra note 21, art. 32.
103. Id. art. 31(2)-(3).
104. Rep. of the Rapporteur of Comm. IV/2 to Comm'n IV, Doc. 933 IV/2/42, 13 U.N.C.1.O.
Doc. 703,710 (1945).
I 05. The only exception is for interpretations grounded in other relevant rules of international
law, including customary international law. VCLT, supra note 21, art. 31(3)(c).
106. U.N. Charter, supra note 3, art. 27, para. 3 (emphasis added).

2016]

Change Without Consent

257

resolution. 107 Others read two possible interpretations into the language: one
requiring the presence and concurring vote of all five permanent members, and
one requiring the concurring vote of all participating permanent members. 108
Myres McDougal and Richard Gardner argued powerfully that the "literal"
reading of the text would gravely contradict the Security Council's purpose of
addressing issues related to collective security, as it
would permit a single permanent member ... by its wilful refusal to participate in
the deliberations of the Council, not simply to protect its own interests in inaction,
but rather to impose upon the other members its views as to how they should or
should not use their collective strength and thu&} perhaps, to dictate to the whole
organization a policy of futility and destruction. 1

In keeping with McDougal and Gardner's effectiveness analysis, the
Security Council's actions seem to favor the less literal reading. Between
January 1946 and December 1949, the Security Council passed roughly forty
nonprocedural decisions with the abstention of one or more permanent
members. 110 When the Soviet Union withdrew during discussion of the Iranian
case in March 1946, the Security Council continued to sit and pass resolutions ,
(although whether these resolutions were substantive or procedural is
debatable). 111 Additionally, when a nonpermanent member was absent during a
substantive vote, the President stated that the member would be counted as
having abstained. 112 And, after the Soviet Union again withdrew in 1950 in
protest of the Council's refusal to seat Nationalist China, the Security Council
nonetheless passed substantive resolutions condemning North Korean
·
113
aggression.
In 1970, the South African government challenged the validity of a
resolution from which two permanent members abstained, arguing that it did
not satisfy Article 27' s requirement. 114 The ICJ disagreed:
[T]he proceedings of the Security Council extending over a long period supply
abundant evidence that presidential rulings and the positions taken by members of
the Council, in particular its permanent members, have consistently and uniformly
interpreted the practice of voluntary abstention by a permanent member as not
constituting a bar to the adoption of resolutions .... This procedure followed by the
Security Council, which has continued unchanged after the amendment in 1965 of
Article 27 of the Charter, has been generally accepted by Members of the United

107. See Leo Gross, Voting in the Security Council: Abstention from Voting and Absence from
Meetings, 60 YALE L.J. 209, 249, 256 (1951) (including abstentions as concurring votes on the grounds
that they manifest "tacit consent"); Yuen-Li Liang, Abstention and Absence of a Permanent Member in
Relation to the Voting Procedure in the Security Council, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 694, 695-96, 695 n.6 (1950)
(citing sources).
I 08. See KELSEN, supra note 78, at 240-41; McDougal & Gardner, supra note 82, at 260, 280.
I 09. McDougal & Gardner, supra note 82, at 285.
110. Liang, supra note I 07, at 696; McDougal & Gardner, supra note 82, at 278.
111. McDougal & Gardner, supra note 82, at 279.
112. Id. at 279-80.
113. Id. at 259.
114. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971
I.CJ. 16, ,i 21 (June 21).
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Nations and evidences a general practice of that Organization. 115

In short, the ICJ found that the Security Council's actions over many years in
conjunction with the lack of protest by member states constituted subsequent
practice evidencing state party agreement as to the proper interpretation of
Article 27.
"Subsequent practice" is a term of art in international law. When
interpreting a treaty, "[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation" must
be taken into account. 116 "Subsequent practice" is thus to be distinguished from
mere "state party conduct"-the former establishes an informal agreement
between states parties regarding the proper• interpretation of a treaty; 117 the
latter is merely how one or more parties implement the treaty or conduct
themselves after concluding the treaty. Subsequent practice is that subset of
state party conduct that all parties agree is relevant to the interpretation of the
treaty.
When state party conduct becomes subsequent practice-when state
action can be deemed to manifest an informal agreement regarding the
interpretation of the treaty-is far from obvious. Rather, there will be a
spectrum, ranging from a written interpretation reflecting the agreement of all
states parties and clearly relevant to interpretation under Article 31(3)(a); to an
unwritten understanding between the states parties manifested by their conduct
and therefore relevant as subsequent practice under Article 31(3)(b); to a state
party's conduct, which might be based on a unilateral and thus illegitimate
interpretation under Article 31 (3 ). Different tribunals have adopted widely
divergent criteria-which is to say, they have drawn different lines in the
sand-distinguishing between these categories. 118
One important consideration when evaluating whether state party conduct
constitutes subsequent practice is when a party's inaction or silence can be
legitimately understood as signaling agreement or acquiescence. A complete
analysis of when state silence signals agreement is beyond the scope of this
Article, but at a minimum the state in question must have known about the
action, had a sufficient period of time to express its dissent, and intentionally
remained silent. 119 For example, in interpreting a treaty between Nicaragua and
Costa Rica regarding the use of the San Juan river, Judge Skotnikov held that
Nicaragua's silence with regard to Costa Rica's use of the river for tourism
115. Id. ,J 22.
116. VCLT,supranote 21, art. 31(3)(b).
117. "Subsequent practice" should also be distinguished from "state practice," one of two
elements required for a norm to be recognized as binding customary international law. See infra Part
III.A.5 (discussing import of this distinction).
118. Cf Arato, supra note 7, at 294-95, 351-52.
119. See Mo loo, supra note 7, at 65-68 (concluding that "in order for silence to be considered
relevant for the purposes of Article 31(3)(b), it must be: in response to the consistent conduct of the
other party or parties reaffirming a particular interpretation; and conduct that the silent party ought
reasonably to be aware of and object to in light of the extent of the party conduct"); cf A. JOHN
SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 80-81 (1979) (discussing the necessary
conditions for silence to be considered "significant" and thus legitimate tacit consent).
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established that Costa Rica enjoyed a right to use the river for tourism. 120 In
reaching this conclusion, Judge Skotnikov relied on the fact that Nicaragua
knew of and never protested Costa Rica's use of the river for tourism (in
contrast to its treatment of Costa Rican police vessels, which Nicaragua
regularly asserted had no right to use the river). 121
Determining when state party silence or inaction is intended to signal
agreement with a proposed interpretation of treaty text is difficult and of
questionable legitimacy in multilateral treaty regimes. Determining when state
party conduct is also subsequent practice signaling agreement to an
interpretation is dubious enough, but it is even more problematic when treaty
interpretation starts to bleed into treaty modification.

4.

When Interpretation Becomes Modification

What obligations does a state assume after it forcibly overthrows another
state's government? 122 The Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions,
which apply during periods of occupation by foreign military forces, "expressly
forbid[]" anything other than minimal interference with the governing structure
of the occupied territory. 123 However, "[i]n recent years, states have
consistently moved beyond the express terms of the Hague and Geneva regime
to introduce sweeping reforms in the aftermath of military intervention." 124 In
other words, actual state party conduct has diverged starkly from the treaty's
language.
Jay Butler characterizes this contradictory state action as subsequent
practice interpreting the treaty. 125 Alternatively, state party conduct might be
described either as subsequent practice evidencing state party agreement to
modify the treaty or as subsequently developed customary international. law
modifying the treaty. Which of these characterizations is correct depends in
large part on the sometimes-fine, sometimes-debatable line between state
practice interpreting and state practice modifying a treaty.
Treaty interpretation must be distinguished from treaty modification. At
least in principle, "interpretation" illuminates a treaty's terms or applicability.
Interpretation may be in line with the existing law ( amendment secundum or
intra legem) or serve a gap-filling function (amendment praeter legem). 126 In
120. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment,
2009 I.CJ. 213,285 (July 13) (separate opinion by Judge Skotnikov).
121. Id.
122. See Jay Butler, Responsibility for Regime Change, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2014).
123. Id. at 511. Butler specifically cites to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on
Land art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277. He also cites the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 64, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
124. Butler, supra note 122, at 513-14.
125. Id. at 506-07 ( describing state conduct as "subsequent practice establishing the agreement
of the parties").
126. GODEFRIDUS J. H. HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 276-79
(1983).
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contrast, "modification" substantially alters the treaty obligations (amendment
contra legem). 127
That being said, "[i]t is inevitably difficult, if not impossible, to fix the
dividing line between interpretation properly so called and modification
effected under the pretext of interpretation." 128 In an attempt to do so, and in
keeping with the teleological approach to treaty interpretation, the ICJ has
attempted to demarcate the outer zone of permissible treaty interpretation:
The principle of interpretation expressed in the maxim: Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat, often referred to as the rule of effectiveness, cannot justify the Court in
attributing to the provisions for the settlement of disputes in the Peace Treaties a
meaning which ... would be contrary to their letter and spirit. 129

State party conduct contrary to the letter and spirit of a treaty effects a
modification, not an interpretation-and, at least according to this ICJ opinion,
cannot be a justifiable reading of the treaty. Of course, whether a certain
interpretation revises or modifies a treaty depends to a large degree on what the
interpreter believes to be the object and purpose of the treaty. 130
Similarly, subsequent practice evidencing agreement regarding a
permissible interpretation of the treaty's text must be distinguished from
subsequent practice that instead evidences agreement to modify the treaty. The
legality of the former was clarified in the Vienna Convention and has a
reputable history; 131 the legality of the latter is subject to some doubt. The
International Law Commission, while drafting articles for the Vienna
Convention, elected to remove a provision providing for treaty modification
based in agreement manifested through the subsequent practice of the states
parties, leaving open the question of the legitimacy of such modification. 132
Because the legitimacy of treaty modification by subsequent practice is
less well-established, those favoring an alteration tend to characterize such
modifications as mere interpretations. This is easy to do where the treaty has
multiple reasonable goals and purposes. For example, in arguing that states are

127. Id.
128. ]AN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 138 (2d ed. 1984);
see also RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 275 (2d ed. 2015) (comparing the search for the
distinction between interpretation and modification to Waiting for Godot, given that (1) the practical
result of the two processes is the same and (2) all state action based on a treaty text is necessarily
interpretative).
129. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Advisory Opinion,
1950 l.C.J. 221, 229 (July 18) (emphasis added); see also !LC Report, supra note 80, at 219 ("[In the
Peace Treaties cases, the !CJ] emphasized that to adopt an interpretation which ran counter to the clear
meaning of the terms would not be to interpret but to revise the treaty.").
130. See, e.g., Peace Treaties, I 950 I.CJ. at 237 (dissenting opinion by Judge Read) (stating,
with regard to the majority's opinion, "[i]n the entire history of the Permanent Court, there is no instance
in which an argument was advanced that went so far in depriving a treaty of a great part of its value, or
in frustrating its general purposes and objects").
13 I. VCLT, supra note 21, art. 31 (3)(b ).
132. See THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: TRA VAUX PREPARATOIRES 309
(Dietrich Rauschning ed., 1978); Akehurst, supra note 14, at 277; Sean D. Murphy, The Relevance of
Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent Practice for the Interpretation of Treaties, in TREATIES AND
SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 82, 89 (Georg Nolte ed., 2013); see also infra text accompanying notes 246,
251-253.

2016]

Change Without Consent

261

merely interpreting the Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention, Butler
presumably reasons that the state party conduct is in line with the treaties'
objects and purposes-perhaps because one of their ultimate goals is the swift
reestablishment of a stable political regime in the occupied state, making any
interpretation that promotes such stability a fair reading. Alternatively, if the
relevant treaty provisions are understood as intended to prioritize respect for a
state's sovereign right to govern itself, the same state party conduct appears to
effect a modification.
While it may be impossible to pinpoint the exact dividing line between
subsequent practice signaling agreement regarding an interpretation or effecting
a modification, there will also be identifiable situations at the far ends of the
spectrum. As discussed above, the Security Council's practices relevant to the
interpretation of Article 27(3), which were consistent and generally went
uncontested, evidenced agreement regarding the provision's interpretation. 133
On the other end of the interpretation/modification continuum, in a
controversial 1964 decision, the ICJ classified certain state action as treaty
interpretation despite the fact that it directly contradicted and thereby
apparently modified the treaty. In 1904, a treaty between Cambodia and
Thailand created a joint commission to demarcate their border according to a
watershed, which placed the ancient Hindu temple of Preah Vihear in Thai
territory. However, a 1907 map drawn by French authorities relocated the
boundary without explanation, placing the temple squarely in Cambodian
territory. The ICJ determined that both parties accepted the French map in 1908
as an "interpretation" of the treaty text: "the Parties at that time adopted an
interpretation of the treaty settlement which caused the map line, in so far as it
may have departed from the line of the watershed, to prevail over the relevant
clause of the treaty." 134 Despite terming this an "interpretation," the ICJ seems
instead to have endorsed modification by subsequent state party conduct. The
original treaty intended to set the boundary in one spot; the 1907 map moved it
elsewhere. Unsurprisingly, this opinion has been critiqued for "blur[ring] the
line between interpretation and amendment." 135 Is such modification
legitimate?
A fair argument can be made that, since treaties may always be modified
by state party consent and since state party conduct may demonstrate a
collective intention to modify a treaty, subsequent practice may be viewed as
evidence of the agreement of the parties to modify a treaty. If legitimate, this
would be an appealing solution to one of the driving concerns of this Article133. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (I 970), Advisory Opinion, 1971
I.CJ. 16, 22 (June 21).
134. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 19621.CJ. 6, 34 (June 15).
135. Moloo, supra note 7, at 79; see also Temple of Preah Vihear, 1962 I.CJ. at 134 (dissenting
opinion by Judge Spender) ("This, in my view, is not treaty interpretation. It amounts, in my opinion, to
redrafting the Treaty of 1904 in accordance with a presumed intention of the two States, an intention
indeed which is not to be found within the terms of the Treaty itself nor, in my view, elsewhere in the
evidence; a presumed intention which is moreover quite inconsistent with the plain terms ... of the
Treaty .... ").
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determining how outdated treaty texts are to be reconciled with contradictory
subsequent state practice.
In particular, recognizing and legitimating modification through
subsequent practice lends clarity to the theory of desuetude, a form of treaty
termination. It is generally assumed that states may allow a treaty, as a whole or
portions thereof, to fall into desuetude by electing not to enforce their rightsby tacitly consenting to a whole or partial termination. For example, France and
Great Britain signed a convention in 1815 requiring the extradition of any
person seeking refuge from one state's prosecution for crimes committed or
civil debts in the East Indies. 136 Between 1815 and 1876, the customary
international law regarding extradition evolved: "States began to view
extradition as a general duty to one another involving principally common
criminals," and "according to the practice of the majority of the States, ... a
State was not obliged to extradite its own nationals." 137 Although France and
Great Britain signed other agreements modifying the 1815 Convention to
comply with these changes in customary international law regarding extradition
with respect to their European territory, the 1815 Convention remained in force
in the East Indies. 138 However, despite the fact that the 1815 Convention
appeared to require the extradition of all individuals for all offenses, in practice
the states restricted its application to nonnational criminal offenses. 139 Based on
the inaction of the states parties, by the early twentieth century the 1815
Convention was considered abandoned in its entirety. 140
Desuetude is a particularly legitimate example of intentional treaty
modification through subsequent practice signaling the agreement of the states
parties, in part because the bar for establishing the tacit consent of states parties
is so high. 141 First, the state must fail to exercise its rights for an extended
period of time. 142 Second, the passage of time alone is not sufficient 143 : "States
party to the treaty must have failed to invoke it in situations where they would
have been expected to do so, or they must have acquiesced in conduct
constituting prima facie a treaty violation." 144 State silence must be
"significant" in order to constitute tacit consent to the treaty's complete or

136. Convention Between Great Britain and France Relative to the Trade in Salt, Opium, and
Saltpetre, in India, Fr.-Gr. Brit., art. 9, Mar. 7, 1815, reprinted in 2 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE
PAPERS 219,225 (1839); see also KONTOU, supra note 14, at 72.
137. KONTOU, supra note 14, at 73.
138. Id. at 72-73.
139. Id. at 73.
140. Id. at 73-74.
141. Both the !CJ and the International Law Commission understand desuetude to be grounded
in the tacit consent of states parties and therefore covered by Article 54 of the Vienna Convention. See
id. at 25-26 (providing examples).
142. Id. at 25.
143. Cf Y oram Dinstein, The Interaction Between Customary International Law and Treaties,
322 RECUEIL DES COURS 243, 414 (2006) ("[D]esuetude of a treaty does not result simply from 'the fact
that no practical use of the treaty provisions has been made over an extended period of time."' (quoting
ATHANASSIOS V AMVOUKOS, TERMINATION OF TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE DOCTRINES OF
REBUS SIC STANT/BUS AND DESUETUDE 276 (1985))).
144. KONTOU, supra note 14, at 25.
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partial termination-a state must remain silent despite knowing there was a
reason to exercise a right and having a period of reasonable duration in which it
could do so. 145 Finally, "[i]t goes without saying that a tacit consent to the
termination of a treaty must be evinced by all the Contracting Parties and not
only by some of them." 146 The legitimacy of desuetude is also grounded in the
fact that it involves a state deciding not to enforce its own treaty rights-which
differs fundamentally from a state arguing for a treaty modification that lessens
its own obligations or limits another state's rights.
While subsequent practice may evidence state party agreement to
allowing all or part of a treaty to fall into desuetude, there are two main
problems with legitimizing other types of treaty modification by subsequent
state practice. First, whose practice constitutes state action? Recall that the state
is not a unitary entity. In the 1963 case United States v. France Air Transport
Services Agreement Arbitration, for example, the conduct of the lower level
administrative officials-who clearly had no authority to conclude treaties on
behalf of their respective states-was controversially considered relevant state
party conduct and "a possible source of a subsequent modification, arising out ,
of certain actions or certain attitudes, having a bearing on the juridical situation
of the Parties and on the rights that each of them could properly claim." 147 It
seems odd that state officials who could not create international obligations
through treaty law nonetheless had the power to modify those obligations. And
it is even more inappropriate to presume the tacit consent of state officials with
such authority, given that they were unlikely to know of the actions of lowerlevel administrators. However, this concern could be addressed, perhaps by
setting limits on which state officials' actions constitute "state party conduct"
for the purpose of assessing whether there is subsequent practice evidencing
agreement to modify a treaty.
Second, states will likely often argue that the silence of their treaty
partners in the face of controversial conduct constitutes subsequent practice
evidencing agreement to a modification. Again, however, it may be difficult to
determine when silence legitimately signals tacit consent. In the Preah Vihear
case there were strong arguments for why, although Thailand never contested
the French map's placement of the temple, it was inappropriate to describe its
silence as acceptance. 148 While this issue might be addressed in the bilateral
context by requiring a high threshold showing that a state's silence was
knowing and intentional over an extended period of time, as is required for
desuetude, it will be nearly impossible to demonstrate in a multilateral treaty
regime. Given the greater number of states parties, state party conduct will
145. See supra text accompanying note 119.
146. Dinstein, supra note 143, at 412.
14 7. Interpretation of the Air Transport Servs. Agreement Between the United States of
America and France, 16 R.I.A.A. 5, 63 (Arb. Trib. 1963).
148. See Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.CJ. 6, 135-39 (June
15) (dissenting opinion by Judge Spender) (noting that the location of the temple was not of great
interest to the parties in 1908-1909 and that France presented the contested map as depicting the true
line of the watershed).
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rarely mature into subsequent practice evidencing agreement regarding a
modification without presuming tacit consent. And demonstrating that all other
treaty parties' silence was knowing, intentional, and persisted for a reasonable
period of time-as is necessary for silence to be sufficiently significant to be
considered consent-will not be possible.

*****
The most obvious options for reconciling treaty text and contradictory
state action are the traditional, formal methods: amendment, supersession, and
the use of additional protocols. Unfortunately, in the case of the U.N. Charter,
the Geneva Conventions, or other such constitutive multilateral treaties, these
formal approaches will often be politically or practically infeasible.
When formal amendment is not a viable option, states may tum to
adaptive interpretation to reconcile their treaty obligations and their actual
practice. By clarifying vague language and filling textual gaps, adaptive
interpretation can rescue many treaty provisions from obsolescence. But words
are not infinitely elastic. As treaties age, state party conduct may increasingly
diverge from the treaty's apparent textual meaning, the intentions of its
drafters, and its object and purpose. Regardless to which school of treaty
interpretation one subscribes, situations will arise where state party conduct is
at odds with any plausible reading of the treaty.
One solution is to claim that the states parties have demonstrated their
agreement to modify the treaty text by their conduct, but given the difficulty of
demonstrating genuine tacit consent, this will often be of questionable
legitimacy in the multilateral context. Alternatively, and with greater
legitimacy, one might characterize many of these situations as instances where
new customary international law has modified the conflicting treaty provisions.
III.

MODIFICATION BY SUBSEQUENTLY DEVELOPED CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW

In certain situations, none of the traditional methods of modifying a treaty
by mutual consent will be compatible with subsequent state conduct. States
nonetheless engage in such conduct-and both the state and other members of
the international community act as though it is lawful. When this occurs, the
most accurate characterization of the situation is that subsequently developed
customary international law has modified the treaty. Not only may this
sometimes be the most legitimate route by which outdated treaty law is
updated, it is increasingly likely to occur in today's world of constitutive
treaties and swiftly developing customary international law.

A.

When Customary International Law Alters Treaty Obligations

Given that tacit state "consent" to new customary international law is
inferior to a state's explicit consent to treaty obligations, the possibility that a
treaty might be modified by subsequent customary international law without
the consent of states parties is anathema to many international law scholars and
practitioners. The purpose of this section is thus primarily descriptive: it
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highlights circumstances where the existence of currently accepted
international law cannot be explained solely in terms of traditional methods of
treaty modification. By providing concrete, historic examples of situations
where subsequently developed customary international law has altered treaty
obligations-sometimes without of the consent of states parties-this section
supports those few scholars who have claimed that customary international law
should be able to modify treaty law. 149
1.

The Possibility ofAutomatic Treaty Termination

Beginning in 15 35, the capitulatory regime-a series of agreements
between the Ottoman Empire and European powers-granted the Capitulatory
Powers certain jurisdictional rights in Turkey: ( 1) Capitulatory Powers'
nationals were subject only to their own national laws, applied by their own
consuls; (2) where Turkish courts retained jurisdiction, the Capitulatory Powers
could intervene in the proceedings; and (3) Capitulatory Powers' nationals were
exempted from most Turkish taxes. 150 As customary international law evolved,
however, "[c ]onsular jurisdiction came to be regarded as incompatible with
sovereignty." 151 Accordingly, in 1914, Turkey announced its intention to··
unilaterally abrogate the Capitulatory treaties on the basis that they were
"obsolete" 152 and "in complete opposition to the juridical rules of the century
and to the principle of national sovereignty." 153 Although some Capitulatory
Powers protested Turkey's unilateral action, at the 1922 Lausanne Conference
they acknowledged that the Capitulations were in direct conflict with
subsequently developed customary sovereign rights 154 and concluded a peace
149. See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 14, at 154; KONTOU, supra note 14, at 20; VILLIGER, supra
note 14, at 58-59; Akehurst, supra note 14, at 275; Bos, supra note 14, at 337.
150. KONTOU, supra note 14, at 78; see also S. Doc. No. 67-34, at 94-96 (1921) (providing an
English translation of the Capitulatory treaty between the Ottoman Empire and France concluded in
February 1535).
151. KONTOU, supra note 14, at 79.
152. Letter from Said Halim, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Henry Morgenthau, U.S.
Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire (Dec. 5, I 914), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, PAPERS
RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT
TOCONGRESSDECEMBER7, 1915,at 1302, 1302(1924).
153. Letter from Said Halim, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Henry Morgenthau, U.S.
Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire (Sept. 9, 1914), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PAPERS
RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO CONGRESS DECEMBER 8, 1914, at 1092, 1092 (1922); see also KONTOU, supra note 14, at 79-80
(describing Turkey's objections to the treaties).
154. Marquis Garroni, the Italian ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, stated, "It must ... be
recognised that according to present-day ideas of law the capitulatory regime is regarded as liable to
diminish the sovereign powers of an independent State; and it is intellible that Turkey should demand
the abolition of this regime, which has had its day." LAUSANNE CONFERENCE ON NEAR EASTERN
AFFAIRS 1922-1923: RECORDS OF PROCEEDINGS AND DRAFT TERMS OF PEACE 467 (1923). Conference
notes say that Camille Barrere, the French ambassador to Italy, expressed the view that the "task of the
conference was to devise a system more suited to modern requirements in place of the capitulatory
system, which was in consonance with archaic ideas," id. at 468, and that the "French delegation had
agreed to renounce the Capitulations because they considered that some features of that regime were out
of date, and that others--especially those respecting financial matters-were in part unjust," id. at 492.
Sir Horace Rombold, the British High Commissioner, insisted that the "Allied delegations ... were not
only willing but anxious to devise a substitute compatible with Turkey's sovereign rights." Id. at 485.
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treaty providing for "the complete abolition of the Capitulations in Turkey in
every respect." 155
The same capitulatory regime that granted Capitulatory Powers nationals
rights in Turkey also applied in Egypt. 156 Egypt similarly protested the
continuance of capitulatory privileges, and in 1937 it invited the Capitulatory
Powers to a conference with the intention of abolishing the regime entirely. It
argued that the regime was "contrary to the principles of modem law" because
it "constitut[ed] an obvious infringement of the sovereignty of the state." 157
Great Britain-one of the Capitulatory Powers-supported Egypt's position
and implied that if the other Powers obstructed Egypt's efforts, Egypt could
make a legal case for its unilateral right to abolish the Capitulations. 158 The
United States agreed, and supported the termination of the Capitulations to
avoid the thorny question of whether Egypt's proposed unilateral termination
would be justified. 159 Ultimately, the Conference participants agreed to
complete abolition of the Egyptian Capitulations. 160
According to conference notes, Maurice Bompard, the former French ambassador to the Ottoman
Empire who took over the French delegation when Barri:re left Lausanne, MARIAN KENT, MOGULS AND
MANDARINS: OIL, IMPERIALISM AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1900-1940, at 113
(2011), acknowledged that the "capitulatory regime was doubtless defective, and in many respects out of
date. Its revision and even its abolition were necessary," LAUSANNE CONFERENCE ON NEAR EASTERN
AFFAIRS 1922-1923, supra, at 499. The preamble to the Draft Convention Respecting the Regime
Applicable to Foreigners in Turkey stated that the parties were "desirous of settling, in accordance with
modem international law, the regime applicable to foreigners in Turkey under conditions consistent both
with the sovereignty of Turkey and with the legitimate protection of their rights." Id. at 790.
155. Treaty of Lausanne art. 28, July 24, 1923, 28 U.N.T.S. 11.
156. See Ri:glement d'Organisation Judiciaire pour Jes Proci:s Mixtes en Egypte, reprinted in
66 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 593 (1874-1875); JASPER YEATES BRINTON, THE MIXED
COURTS OF EGYPT (I 930); see also KONTOU, supra note 14, at 82-85 (recounting history of the
Capitulatory treaties with Egypt).
157. Telegram from Bert Fish, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, to Cordell Hull, U.S. Sec'y of State
(Jan. 17, 1937) (containing English translation ofa message from Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs),
reprinted in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS: THE BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH, EUROPE, NEAR EAST AND AFRICA 615, 615-16 (1937).
158. Aide-Memo ire from the British Embassy to the U.S. Dep't of State (Feb. 23, 1937) (noting
that "His Majesty's Government have promised to support the Egyptian Government in persuading the
capitulatory Powers to agree to the abolition of the capitulations in Egypt" and that "His Majesty's
Government ... feel it their duty to intimate confidentially and without delay to the United States
Government that it is by no means clear that the Egyptian Government could not make a good legal case
for a right to abolish the capitulations unilaterally"), reprinted in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS: THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, EUROPE, NEAR EAST AND AFRICA 622,
622-23 ( I 93 7).
159. Letter from Cordell Hull, U.S. Sec'y of State, to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
(Mar. I 9, 1937) ("The Department is of the opinion that every reasonable effort should be made to
cooperate with the Egyptian Government and the other capitulatory powers for the realization of the
Egyptian Government's desire to be freed from the burden of the capitulatory regime, since such
cooperation would be thoroughly in accord with our good neighbor policy. For that reason and in order
to avoid the raising of any question as to the legal right of the Egyptian Government unilaterally to
terminate the capitulatory regime,-a right which the Egyptian Government appears to have reserved by
the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of August 26, I 936,-it is respectfully recommended that I be
authorized to instruct the American Delegation to the Conference ... to give to the Egyptian Delegation
assurances in the sense of the views expressed herein."), reprinted in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS: THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, EUROPE, NEAR EAST AND
AFRICA 628, 631-32 (1937).
160. Convention Regarding the Abolition of the Capitulations in Egypt, May 8, 1937, reprinted
in ACTES DE LA CONFERENCE DES CAPITULATIONS: MONTREUX, 12 AVRIL-8 MAI 1937, at 259 (1937);
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When signed in 1903, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty granted the United
States "in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land
under water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and
protection" of the Panama Canal. 161 It also granted the United States "all the
rights, power and authority . . . which the United States would possess and
exercise as if it were the sovereign ... to the entire exclusion of the exercise by
the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority." 162
Although the treaty was revised in 1936 163 and 1955 164 by mutual consent of
the parties, Panama remained dissatisfied with its terms. Perhaps because it was
unable to back up a unilateral denunciation of the treaty by force, in 1962 it
argued before the United Nations that the treaty did "not conform to the
principles, precepts and rules of law, justice and international morality which
are universally accepted today." 165 In 1973, Panama again claimed that the
Treaty was incompatible with
the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation
among states, and particularly those pertaining to respect for the territorial integrity
and political independence of States, nonintervention, equality of rights and selfdetermination of peoples, the sovereign equality of States, the elimination of all
forms of foreign domination, the right of peoples and nations to permanent
sovereignty over their natural resources, and international co-operation in the
economic and social development of all nations. 166

In other words, Panama maintained that the Treaty had been rendered obsolete
by new customary international law. 167 Many countries agreed that the Treaty
was not in keeping with the post-World War II international order, 168
see also KONTOU, supra note 14, at 84 (describing the Montreux Conference).
161. Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, supra note I, art. II.
162. Id. art. III.
163. General Treaty ofFriendship and Co-Operation, U.S.-Pan., Mar. 2, 1936, 53 Stat. 1807.
164. Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Co-Operation, U.S.-Pan., Jan. 25, 1955, 6 U.S.T.
2273, 243 U.N.T.S. 211.
165. U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1130th plen. mtg. ,r 152, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1130 (Sept. 25, 1962).
166. U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., 1704th plen. mtg. ,r 56, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1704 (Mar. 21, 1973).
167. KONTOU, supra note 14, at 76.
168. The Colombian representative was of the view that failure to revise the treaty "would be
tantamount to maintaining in perpetuity situations of colonial domination and being left behind by
history," noting that the Security Council had "made possible the necessary re-adjustment of old
situations inherited from the past century" and the advent of a "new international order." U.N. SCOR,
28th Sess., 1696th plen. mtg. ,r,1139, 141, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1696 and Corr.I (Mar. 15, 1973). The Cuban
representative contended the 1903 treaty did "not truly exist in the light of international law and the
Charter of the United Nations." Id. ,r 189. The representative from El Salvador argued that revision of
the 1903 treaty was necessary "to write off and cancel one of those historical mortgages and to do so by
bringing to bear the entire body of ideas, principles and norms that the international community has
evolved over the last decades." U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., 1697th plen. mtg. ,r 43, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1697
(Mar. 16, 1973). The Australian representative acknowledged "that the 1903 Convention contains
features that are anachronistic and overdue for change" and the desire on the part of the Panamanian
government and people "to have the agreement brought up to date to accord with present-day realities
and international concepts." U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., 1699th plen. mtg. ,r 111, U.N. Doc. S/PV/1699 and
Corr. I (Mar. 19, 1973). The Canadian representative stated, "Reviewing developments since the first
Convention 70 years ago, in 1903, it is clear that, as the poet said, the old order changeth, yielding place
to new." U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., 1700th plen. mtg. ,r 173, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1700 (Mar. 19, 1973). See
also KONTOU, supra note 14, at 76-77 (quoting other representatives at U.N. Security Council
meetings).
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pressuring the United States to agree to a revision. Although the United States
had no duty to alter the hugely beneficial treaty, 169 it negotiated new
agreements designed to comply with the new customary international law. 170
Finally, a 1969 "permanent" fisheries convention between Morocco and
Spain set the limit of the states' territorial seas at twelve miles from the
baseline and specifically stipulated that future extensions of the territorial
waters under international law would not modify the treaty unless the parties so
agreed. 171 In 1973-just four years later!-Morocco enacted domestic
legislation with the effect of unilaterally abrogating the spirit, if not the letter,
of the convention by claiming exclusive fishing rights up to seventy miles off
its coast. 172 After seizure and capture incidents and much negotiation, the states
signed additional fisheries agreements in 1973, 173 1977, 174 and 1983, 175
ultimately validating Morocco's claim to a seventy-mile fishing zone. 176
Admittedly, these examples are not the strongest evidence of the
possibility of treaty modification by subsequently developed customary
international law. First, all of these apparent conflicts between the two main
sources of international legal obligations were ultimately resolved through
supersession, not by recognition of subsequently developed customary
international law. Accordingly, these examples might seem to support the claim
that formal action is needed for treaty modification. Second, ascribing the need
for new treaties entirely to the existence of new customary international law
risks overstating the role the latter plays. While the legal environment had
certainly changed, so had political circumstances. Following World War I and
the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the balance of power in Eurasia shifted
dramatically. The dawn of the postcolonial era may have emboldened Turkey,
Egypt, and Panama and have encouraged colonial powers to be more
accommodating. Finally, Francisco Franco died towards the end of 1975,
ushering in a new democratic Spanish government with different aims and
interests.
There is, however, some evidence that a new international legal
169. Malcolm E. Wheeler, Note, Toward the Peaceful Modification of Treaties: The Panama
Canal Proposals, 21 STAN. L. REV. 938,948 (1969).
170. Id.
171. Morocco-Spain Fishery Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 3, 7; see also KONTOU, supra note
14, at 68-71 (describing the evolution of Morocco and Spain's treaty relationship).
172. Dahir Portant Loi No. I. 73.211 du 2 mars 173 Fixant la Li mite des Eaux Territorial es et de
la Zone de Peche Exclusive Marocaines [Morocco Decree-Law No. 173.211, 2 March 1973, Fixing the
Limit of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Fishing Zone], reprinted in 7 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LA w
OF THE SEA 166 (Myron Nordquist et al. eds., 1980). The 1969 treaty referred only to "territorial waters"
and not to "exclusive fishing zones." KONTOU, supra note 14, at 70-71.
173. Act of Rabat on the Spanish-Moroccan Negotiations Concerning Maritime Fisheries,
Morocco-Spain, May 12, 1973, reprinted in 5 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 18 (Robin
Churchill et al. eds., 1977).
174. Espagne et Maroc: Approbation par le Congres espagnol le I 5 fevrier 1978 de /'accord de
peche hispano-marocain du 17 fevrier 1977, 82 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
I 107-08 (1978).
175. Espagne et Maroc: Signature de /'accord de peche du 18 aout 1983, 88 REVUE GENERALE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 231-32 (1984).
176. KONTOU, supra note 14, at 69-70.
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environment influenced the negotiation of the subsequent agreements. Turkey,
Egypt, and Panama-the "weaker" parties in their respective disputes-all
invoked and relied heavily on new customary international law norms. In the
case of the Capitulatory treaties, even states parties who stood to lose
significant rights agreed that the treaties might be lawfully unilaterally
abrogated-presumably due to the subsequently developed customary
international law. In agreeing to renegotiate the U.S. relationship with Panama
in 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger noted the "profoundly transformed
legal environment" and that the canal could no longer "operate[] under the
terms of a treaty signed in 1903, when the realities of international affairs were
still shaped by traditional precepts of power." 177 Finally, during the various
negotiations of the revised fisheries agreements, Spain never attempted to rely
on its contracted-for rights under the original 1969 treaty, 178 suggesting an
implicit acknowledgment that those treaty rights no longer carried significant
legal weight in the face of contradictory new customary international law.
Additionally, recognizing the existence of new customary international
law is "deeply entangled" with the making of new customary international
law. 179 It is not simply a matter of states acknowledging a new customary rule
and negotiating superseding treaties in its shadow. Rather, as Myres McDougal
has described it, the process is one of "continuous interaction ... in which the
decision-makers ... unilaterally put forward claims ... and in which other
decision-makers . . . weigh and appraise these competing claims . . . and
ultimately accept or reject them." 180 As a result, "[a]ny decision relating to the
[customary international law] norm-even a decision that might reasonably be
characterized as a 'finding'-has some prescriptive effect." 181 The very fact
that states considered, debated, or accepted the possibility of unilateral
abrogation of the respective treaties contributed to the recognition of the
customary international law upon which those abrogations would have been
grounded-as well as the underlying possibility of unilateral treaty abrogation
based on the development of new customary international law.

2.

Reducing States Parties' Obligations

The submarine is considered a warship, subject to the laws of armed
conflict governing surface warships. 182 This law was clarified in part in the
1909 Declaration of London, which permitted the destruction of captured

177. Henry Kissinger, U.S. Sec'y of State, Address in Panama (Feb. 7, 1974), in DEP'T ST.
BULL., Feb. 25, 1974, at 181, 181-82.
178. KONTOU, supra note 14, at 70.
179. Hakimi, supra note 41, at 156-163 (considering this process in light of the Tadic decision
and the ICRC customary international humanitarian law database).
180. Myres S. McDougal, Comment, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of
the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356,357 (1955).
181. Hakimi, supra note 41, at 158.
182. D.P. O'Connell, International Law and Contemporary Naval Operations, 44 BRIT. Y.B.
!NT'L L. 19, 45 (1970). In 1899, Great Britain, with Germany's support, unsuccessfully attempted to
outlaw submarines as a weapon of war. Id.
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merchant vessels only if the capturing vessel could not safely take the captured
one into port for a prize hearing. 183 However, to sink a captured vessel, the
capturing warship had to first ensure the safety of her crew and any
passengers. 184 That submarines were necessarily endangered by taking captured
ships to port (because their success and safety depended on stealth, not superior
power) and physically incapable of taking on additional passengers was
apparently irrelevant. When World War I broke out, Germany initially
attempted to comply with these requirements. 185 As it lost ground, however, it
gradually began to permit its submarine commanders to target merchant
ships. 186 By early 1917, Germany was practicing unrestricted submarine
warfare within its declared war zone. 187
At the 1922 Washington Conference after the war, Great Britain again
tried, and again failed, to completely ban the use of submarines. 188 The
participants did, however, adopt a general resolution that, among other things,
prohibited the destruction of a merchant vessel "'unless its crew and passengers
have been placed in safety. "' 189 In 1930, the London Naval Treaty explicitly
prohibited submarines from sinking potentially hostile merchant vessels
without having first ensured the safety of their passengers, crew, and ship's
papers. 190 These provisions were reiterated to the letter in the 1936 London
Protocol, 191 ratified by all naval powers, including Germany. 192 This
requirement was roundly criticized as "an unworkable ideal couched in
ambiguous terms which did not address the practicalities of submarine
warfare." 193
Notwithstanding the widespread agreement to the Protocol, in World War
II, all naval participants with the means to do so (except Japan) engaged in
some form of unrestricted submarine warfare. 194 After the war, the International
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg found Grand Admiral Doenitz, the
Commander in Chief of the German Navy, guilty of violating the London

183. Declaration of London Concerning the Law of Naval War arts. 48, 49, Feb. 26, 1909, 208
Consol. T.S. 338. Although all participants at the conference signed the Declaration, none ratified it.
184. Id. art. 50.
185. See O'Connell, supra note 182, at 46-48 (detailing Germany's internal debates regarding
the legality of increasing unrestricted submarine warfare and international responses).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 48.
188. Id. at 49.
189. Id.
190. London Naval Treaty, supra note 2, art. 22.
191. Proces-verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the
Treaty of London of 22 April 1930, Nov. 6, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 353, 357 [hereinafter London Protocol]
("(A] warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a
merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For
this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and
crew is assured .... ").
192. Jane Gilliland, Note, Submarines and Targets: Suggestions for New Codified Rules of
Submarine Waifare, 73 GEO. L.J. 975,978 (1985).
193. Hays Parks, Submarine-Launched Cruise Missiles and International Law: A Response,
103 U.S. NAVALINST.PROC. 120, 120(1977).
194. Gilliland, supra note 192, at 985.
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Protocol. 195 However, in light of widespread violations of the same regulation
by British and U.S. forces, the Tribunal explicitly did not base Doenitz's
sentence on this particular violation. I% Accordingly, one scholar described the
prohibitions of the London Protocols as "blue law[s]"-clear, but outdated and
thus unenforceable rules. 197
Technically, the London Protocol's requirements remain in place today,
binding all states parties. 198 However, subsequent and contradictory state
practice has created a vast number of customary exceptions to the treaty rules.
As noted in the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law:
[C]ustomary international law now provides that the London Protocol of 1936,
coupled with the customary practice of belligerents during and following World
War II, imposes upon submarines the responsibility to provide for the safety of
passengers, crew, and ship's papers before destruction of an enemy merchant
vessel, unless the enemy merchant vessel persistently refuses to stop when duly
summoned to do so; it actively resists visit and search or capture; it is sailing under
convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft; it is armed; it is incorporated
into, or is assisting in any way the enemy's military intelligence system; it is acting
in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an enemy's armed forces; or the
enemy has integrated its merchant shipping into its war-fighting effort and
compliance with the London Protocol of 1936 would, under the circumstances of
the specific encounter, subject the submarine to imminent danger or would
. prec Iude m1ss1on
. . accomp1·1shment. 199
otherw1se

The customary "exceptions" to the treaty law have essentially swallowed the
rule. At least until the San Remo Manual was finalized in 1994, 200 "submarine
operations in times of war [were] governed by no legal text. " 201 Instead, they
195. Id. at 988.
196. Id. at 988-89.
197. Alex A. Kerr, International Law and the Future of Submarine Warfare, 81 U.S. NAVAL
INST. PROC. 1105, 1107 (1955). For an alternative reading of the Tribunal's decision, see Jon L.
Jacobson, The Law of Submarine Warfare Today, in 64 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES 205, 212
(Horace B. Robertson, Jr. ed., 1991 ).
198. London Naval Treaty, supra note 2, art. 23 (providing that the treaty would expire on
December 31, 1936, with the exception of Article 22, which would "remain in force without limit of
time").
199. J. Ashley Roach, Submarine Warfare, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L.,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/l 0.1093/law:epil/978019923l690/law978019923 l 690e412?rskey=ugUuAj
&result=2&prd=OPIL (Aug. 2009) (emphasis added); see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, THE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 'I[ 8.2.2.2 (1989) (noting that "the
rules of the 1936 London Protocol ... must be interpreted in light of current technology ... as well as
the customary practice of belligerents that evolved during and following World War II" and listing
circumstances when enemy merchant vessels may be attacked and destroyed); id. at 8.3.1.
200. The San Remo Manual was drafted in part to address the lack of clear law regarding
submarines. See Louise Doswald-Beck, San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed
Conflicts at Sea, INT'L REV. RED CROSS, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 583, 590.
20 I. O'Connell, supra note 182, at 52; see also Gilliland, supra note 192, at 991. But see
Howard Levie, Submarine Warfare: With Emphasis on the 1936 London Protocol, 70 INT'L L. STUD.
293, 325 (1993) (concluding that, notwithstanding extensive violations, the "1936 London Submarine
Protocol continues to be a valid and subsisting part of the law of war at sea").
Interestingly, one proponent of the continuing validity of the London Protocol nonetheless
implicitly accepts that customary international law might modify the treaty. Wolff Heintschel von
Heinegg, The Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 463,521 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013) ("[I]n view of the continuing validity of the LondonProt
1936 and since no rule of customary law to the contrary has developed, submarines are subject to the
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were regulated by subsequently developed customary international law, which
had effectively rewritten the London Protocol to reduce states parties'
obligations (and expand their rights) with regard to the lawful use of
submarines. 202

3.

Increasing States Parties' Obligations

One hundred ninety-five states are party to the 1949 Fourth Geneva
Convention. Of these, 173 are party to the 1977 First Additional Protocol, 203
which expands the definition of international conflicts, extends many of the
protections of the Conventions, and clarifies the applicability of certain
customary norms. Specifically, Article 70 of the First Additional Protocol
enlarges on the obligations associated with relief operations in nonoccupation
situations, originally described in Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that states parties
must "allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores
and objects necessary for religious worship intended only for civilians" and
"likewise permit the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs,
clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and
maternity cases." 204 In brief, under Article 23, a state party must allow the free
passage of a narrow category of items for all civilians and of a broader category
of items for a smaller group of especially vulnerable civilians.
Article 70 of the First Additional Protocol provides that states parties to
the treaty and to the conflict "allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage
of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel" to
the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the conflict,
other than occupied territory, [if it] is not adequately provided with [food, medical
supplies, clothing, bedding, means of shelter, other supplies essential to the survival
of the civilian population, and objects necessary for religious worship] .... In the
distribution of relief consignments, priority shall be given to those persons, such as
children, expectant mothers, maternity cases and nursing mothers, who, under the
Fourth Convention or under this Protocol, are to be accorded privileged treatment or
. I protect10n.
. 205
specia

Article 70 thus requires the free passage of humanitarian personnel and far
same rules as surface ships." (emphasis added)).
202. I argue elsewhere that prohibitions on submarine warfare failed in part because submarines
were uniquely effective at accomplishing certain military objectives and, due to the immutable
characteristics of submarine's design, they were incapable of being used in compliance with the
regulations. Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 42. To the extent treaties attempt to regulate new
technologies without consideration of its architecture, they are similarly susceptible to modification by
subsequently developed customary international law. Cf Rebecca Crootof, Why the Ban on Permanently
Blinding Lasers is Poor Precedent for a Prohibition on Autonomous Weapon Systems, LA WF ARE (Nov.
24, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-prohibition-permanently-blinding-lasers-poor
-precedent-ban-autonomous-weapon-systems.
203. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
First Additional Protocol].
204. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 123, art. 23.
205. First Additional Protocol, supra note 203, art. 70.
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broader categories of relief supplies for all civilians, although especially
vulnerable ones are accorded priority in distribution.
Additionally, Article 70 limits Article 23 's possible exceptions. Article 23
permits states to limit the free passage of the consignments if it believes there
are
serious reasons for fearing:
(a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination,
(b) that the control may not be effective, or
(c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of
the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned consignments for goods
which would otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy or through the
release of such material, services or facilities as would otherwise be required for the
production of such goods.2 06

Meanwhile, under Article 70, the state party allowing passage "shall, in no way
whatsoever, divert relief consignments from the purpose for which they are
intended nor delay their forwarding, except in cases of urgent necessity in the
interest of the civilian population concerned." 207
The International Committee of the Red Cross describes the Article 70
obligations as customary international law. Rule 55 of its customary
international humanitarian law database states: 'The parties to the conflict must
allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for
civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any
adverse distinction, subject to their right of control." 208 Rule 56 provides: "The
parties to the conflict must ensure the freedom of movement of authorized
humanitarian relief personnel essential to the exercise of their functions. Only
in case of imperative military necessity may their movements be temporarily
restricted." 209 Assuming this characterization is correct, all states are bound
under customary international law to comply with Article 70, despite the fact
that twenty-two states parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention have not
ratified the First Additional Protocol.
It has long been recognized that treaty law may evolve into new
customary international law and thereby create international obligations for
nonmember states. Usually, this is viewed as the creation of an international
obligation where none previously existed. 210 But from another perspective, this
is merely a lesser version of treaty modification by subsequently developed
customary international law: a state has elected not to join a treaty regime, but

206. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 123, art. 23.
207. First Additional Protocol, supra note 205, art. 70.
208. Int'! Comm. Red Cross, Rule 55, Access for Humanitarian Relief to Civilians in Need,
CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE (2016), http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v l _ rul_rule55.
209. Int'! Comm. Red Cross, Rule 56, Freedom of Movement of Humanitarian Relief
Personnel, CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE (2016), http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v I_rul
rule56.
210. See, e.g., Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 1007 (2012) (noting
that when customary international law evolves from treaty norms, it "is almost conceived of as a passive
recipient of settled norms worked out through treaty negotiations against a tabula rasa").
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it nonetheless may incur those same treaty obligations in the guise of customary
international law. This runs directly counter to the traditional understanding
that "if a state does not consent to an international treaty, it is clearly not bound
· prov1s10ns.
· ·
,,211
by its
But here, something even more contentious is occurring. To the extent the
new customary rules enlarge upon the treaty obligations expressed in the
Fourth Geneva Convention, this is a situation where states' treaty obligations
have not only been modified, but have been substantively and substantially
increased by subsequently developed customary international law. This
customary "end run" around treaty law is highly controversial. 212 However, at
least in the case of Article 70, it seems to have occurred. States that have not
ratified the First Additional Protocol are often admonished for actions that do
not comply with Article 70. 213 Israel-which is party to the Fourth Geneva
Convention, but not to the First Additional Protocol-has formally
acknowledged this development: in the 2008 Al-Bassiouni case, Israel's High
Court of Justice observed that Israel accepted Article 70 as "customary
international law," imposing an obligation "to allow the passage of essential
humanitarian goods to the Gaza Strip." 214
Nor is this the only example of subsequently developed customary
international law creating additional obligations contrary to existing treaty law.
Monica Hakimi details how the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia's expansive Tadic decision 215 resulted in states assuming
obligations they had explicitly rejected, 216 and customary international law
regarding non-refoulement might require states to protect individuals who
would not qualify as refugees under relevant treaties, extending state
obligations beyond treaties' explicit definitions for both signatories and
nonsignatories. 217 In these circumstances, new customary international law
increases state obligations notwithstanding the contradictory treaty-and

211. Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International
Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 488 (2005).
212. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, My Initial Reactions to the ICRC Customary International
Humanitarian Law Study, KENNETH ANDERSON'S LAW OF WAR AND JUST THEORY BLOG (Nov. 14,
2005), http ://kennethandersonlawofwar. b logspot. com/2005/1 I /my-initial-reactions-to-icrc-customary
.html; see also Iain Scobbie, The Approach to Customary International Law in the Study, in
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 15, 34
(Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007) ("Can States be expected to accept as customary that
which they have rejected as a conventional obligation?").
213. See, e.g., Int'] Comm. Red Cross, Practice Relating to Rule 55, Access for Humanitarian
Relief to Civilians in Need (2016), CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng
I docs/v2 _ rul _ rul e5 5.
214. HCJ 9132/07 Al-Bassiouni Ahmed v. Prime Minister, ,r,r 13, 15 (2008) (Isr.)
(unpublished). Similarly, Malaysia, which is also not a party to the First Additional Protocol, has argued
that blockades are prohibited "if [they] [are] used to prevent the free passage of relief consignments."
U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., 13th mtg. ,r,r 8, I 0-11, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/65/SR.13 (Oct. I 0, 2010).
215. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int'] Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
216. Hakimi, supra note 41, at I 69.
217. See Deborah Perluss & Joan F. Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary
Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551 (1986).
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thereby modifies it (provided the treaty obligation does not survive as lex
. 1·zs.
) 218
specza

4.

A Complex Relationship

The 1958 Convention on the High Seas provides that the "high seas"
encompass "all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in
the internal waters of a State" and notes that "no State may validly purport to
subject any part of [the high seas] to its sovereignty."219 This freedom of the
high seas includes, inter alia, the freedom to fish. 220 During the extended
drafting period of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, however, it became
clear that coastal states would soon obtain the right to exclude others from
fishing in a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. 221 Accordingly, before the 1982
Convention took effect and formally superseded the 1958 Convention, states
began unilaterally taking measures to exclude others from fishing in those
waters. 222
Oscar Schachter argues that this is an example of a situation where
customary international law "replaced clear treaty obligations ... without any
formal abrogation of the existing treaties. " 223 However, it also raises a chickenand-egg issue: would the states have been willing to act unilaterally in violation
of the 1958 Convention in the absence of the substantial agreement with regard
to draft treaty articles of the 1982 Convention, which were poised to supersede
the 1958 Convention? In addition to being a situation where customary
international law modified treaty obligations, this is also an example of how
different methods of updating a treaty may work in tandem to spur quicker
change.
The relationship between the different approaches to treaty
modification-by amendment, supersession, adaptive interpretation, and
subsequently developed customary international law-is necessarily a
complicated one. As evidenced in many of the foregoing examples, these
various methods will rarely operate in isolation. Turkey, Egypt, and Panama
relied on new customary international law regarding state sovereignty to
pressure reluctant treaty partners to agree to new, superseding arrangements.
Similarly, Canada and France phased out French fishing rights in Canadian
waters in recognition of the evolving customary law of the sea, and France and
Great Britain renegotiated treaties based on new customary international law
regarding extradition. Changes in the customary law of armed conflict
persuaded most states parties to the CCCW that formal amendment was
required. And clarifying and gap-filling adaptive interpretations often
accommodate and guide the development of state conduct that might otherwise
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See infra Part III.B.4.
Convention on the High Seas arts. I, 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
Id. art. 2.
SCHACHTER, supra note 36, at 77-78.
Id.
Id.
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ripen into contradictory customary international law. Treaty modification by
customary international law is not merely an alternate route by which outdated
treaties are updated; it may also prompt states to engage in more traditional
means of treaty modification.

5.

Addressing an Alternative Characterization

In all of the above examples, it appears that subsequently developed
customary international law affected treaty law----either by allowing states to
pressure their treaty partners into altering outdated treaty obligations or by
reducing or increasing states parties' obligations, notwithstanding explicit and
contradictory treaty text. To the extent these and other similar examples have
been acknowledged in scholarship, however, they tend to be characterized as
subsequent state practice evidencing agreement to modify a treaty-and not as
modification based on new customary international law. Why is this distinction
important?
Recall the Hague Regulation and Geneva Convention provisions
prohibiting occupying states from engaging in anything other than minimal
interference with the governing structure of the occupied territory. 224 Butler
described current contradictory state action as subsequent practice interpreting
the treaties; 225 however, it might also be seen as subsequent practice evidencing
state party agreement to modify the treaties or subsequently developed
customary international law modifying the treaties. Which is the best
characterization of what actually occurred? Assuming for present purposes that
one cannot credibly make the case that current state conduct is in keeping with
the object and purpose of the treaties, 226 and assuming that modification by
subsequent practice evidencing state party agreement is legitimate, 227 today's
state conduct is best explained as lawful due to a new customary international
law norm permitting an occupier's involvement in certain aspects of an
occupied territory's political processes.
Because most states will be party to constitutive treaties like the Hague
and Geneva Conventions, subsequently developed customary international law
might initially appear indistinguishable from subsequent practice evidencing
agreement to modify a multilateral treaty. Some states parties to a treaty will
engage in practices apparently at odds with their treaty obligations, some states
parties may complain about such conduct, and most states parties will remain
silent. Over time, however, once-contested practices-here, interference with
an occupied territory's political process-will face less and less criticism, until
it seems that a general consensus has arisen that the practices are permissible,

224. Butler, supra note 122, at 511-14.
225. Id. at 506-07.
226. My aim here is not to definitively determine the object and purposes of the Hague
Regulation and Geneva Conventions, but rather to highlight the distinction between subsequent practice
evidencing agreement to a modification and modification by customary international law in multilateral
treaty regimes.
227. See supra Part II.C.4.
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notwithstanding the apparently contradictory treaty text. Whether this process
is characterized as subsequent state practice evidencing agreement to a
modification or as subsequently developed customary international law
modifying a treaty might therefore appear to be a difference of terminology
only, with little practical import.
From a doctrinal standpoint, however, the legitimacy of the modification
hinges on this distinction. As discussed earlier, it will be difficult-if not
impossible-in a multilateral regime to establish that state party conduct
actually reflects uniform agreement to a treaty modification. Due to the sheer
number of states parties, most state consent to a modification must necessarily
be inferred, but conditions will rarely be such that state party silence or inaction
may legitimately be characterized as tacit consent. To purport that
contradictory state party conduct is actually subsequent practice manifesting
agreement regarding a modification undermines the legitimacy of an otherwise
justifiable possibility of treaty modification through subsequent practice. 228 To
the extent that proposition diminishes the standard for tacit consent to a treaty
modification, it may even invite abuses in the bilateral context of treaty
modification by subsequent practice-as arguably occurred in the Preah Vihear
case. 229

B. Doctrinal Arguments
When a treaty obligation is fundamentally at odds with a subsequently
developed customary international law, which source of international legal
obligations should guide a state's behavior? The treaty provision, to which the
state explicitly consented? Or the norm of customary international law, which
may more accurately represent the current and most practical rule? This section
considers various doctrinal arguments for which source of legal obligations
should prevail when an older treaty and a new customary obligation conflict.

1.

Consent Theory

The primary argument for why a treaty obligation should never be
modified by a new norm of customary international law is grounded in the
theory that all international law is based on state consent: states consent
explicitly to the assumption of treaty obligations and consent only tacitly to
their customary international law obligations. 230 Accordingly, "[i]nternational
conventions are the best evidence of the will of states, and thus are considered
the primary source of international law." 231
228. Cf JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How THE
WTO RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (2003) (distinguishing between treaty
modification by desuetude and subsequent state practice, which are grounded in implied state consent,
and treaty modification by subsequently developed customary international law, which is due to the
development of new law).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 134-135.
230. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 12, at 26-28; Glennon, supra note 11, at 941.
231. Walter G. Sharp, Sr., The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage During Armed
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But this argument carries weight only to the extent one accepts consent
theory as the sole explanation for the legitimacy of the entire international legal
system. While it is an appealing theoretical solution to the paradox of why
states can be both sovereign entities and subject to rules, it is internally
inconsistent. Why can treaties sometimes bind nonconsenting third states? Why
may inattentive states be bound by new customary norms, and why are new
states bound by old norms to which they never consented? Why can't a postregime-change state-or, frankly, any state-unilaterally revoke its consent to
be bound by treaty or customary international law? For these and a host of
other reasons, consent theory is increasingly coming under fire. 232 While a full
investigation of the problems with consent theory is beyond the scope of this
Article, the fact that customary international law does seem able to modify
treaty obligations provides yet another example of why consent theory,
standing alone, does not fully explain how the international legal system
operates and evolves.
In an attempt to resolve the gap between theory and reality, some consent
theorists have proposed an alternative understanding of what is happening
when subsequently developed customary international law modifies a treaty.
They suggest that, because customary international law is grounded in tacit
state consent, it can modify earlier treaty law because such modification is
made with the consent of the states parties. 233 For example, Michael Akehurst
contends that "subsequent custom can terminate a treaty only when there is
clear evidence that that is what the parties intend." 234
Even assuming that the explicit consent states express in treaties and the
tacit consent states are presumed to give new customary international law
norms should be weighted equally, 235 the claim that the binding nature of
customary international law is justified through states' tacit consent cannot
survive closer scrutiny. For the theory of tacit consent to justify the binding
nature of customary international law, it must jettison the requirements that the

Conflict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, 137 MIL. L. REV. I, 6 (1992); see also MARK W.
JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (4th ed. 2003) (arguing that treaties'
preeminence with regard to customary international law "is justified because most treaties so plainly
show both the terms of international legal rules and the consent of states to be bound by such rules");
Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413,438 (1983)
(describing treaty norms as having "once been regarded as the archetypal rule of international law
because [they are] the purest expression of classic consensualism").
232. See supra note 15 for a review of criticisms.
233. See e.g., KONTOU, supra note 14, at 20 (observing that there is no hierarchy between
treaties and customary international law because they are "equivalent expressions of [states'] consent to
be bound internationally"); Akehurst, supra note 14, at 275 & n.5 (citing "writers who regard custom as
an implied agreement between States"); Kerstin Odendahl, Article 39: General Rule Regarding the
Amendment of Treaties, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 699, 704
(Oliver Dorr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012) (characterizing modification by subsequently
developed customary international law as based on "tacit agreement"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 102 n.4 (1987) ("Provisions in international
agreements are superseded by principles of customary law that develop subsequently, where the parties
to the agreement so intend.").
234. Akehurst, supra note 14, at 276.
235. Cf SIMMONS, supra note 119, at 80.
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consent is given intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily-in short, the moral
basis for why consent creates a binding legal obligation. 236

2.

A Battle of Norms

The conflict between the treaty prov1s10n and subsequently developed
customary international law might be reconceived as a conflict between
customary norms. One of the most fundamental rules of the international legal
structure is pacta sunt servanda-the customary rule, codified in the Vienna
Convention, 237 that agreements must be kept. Thus, the conflict might be
described as a conflict between two customary rules: pacta sunt servanda and
the specific customary norm at issue. Because pacta sunt servanda is such an
essential rule-indeed, many scholars consider it to be jus cogens, which
implies that it can be modified only by another rule of equivalent weight238 -it
(and, by extension, the treaty provision) should prevail over lesser conflicting
customary international law norms. Only when the conflicting customary norm
is sufficiently fundamental-as was the case with Turkey's and Egypt's
challenges to the Capitulatory regimes, which were grounded on the new but
fundamental customary norm of sovereign state rights-will it present a real
challenge to pacta sunt servanda.
One benefit to this argument is that it provides a theoretical explanation
for why international tribunals generally privilege treaty text over contrary
subsequently developed customary international law. 239 However, this analysis
also invites the question of how to determine which of two significant
conflicting norms are more fundamental to the working of the international
legal system, a question that may require comparing apples to oranges. 240 Nor
does it explain why new customary norms that are clearly inferior to pacta sunt
servanda-like those regarding the use of submarines-are accepted and thus
apparently acceptable.

3.

Arguments Grounded in the Vienna Convention

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides the laws
regarding how treaties are created, interpreted, modified, and terminated. It has
236. Cf id. at 77.
237. VCLT, supra note 21, pmbl., art. 26.
238. See, e.g., JANIS, supra note 231, at 66. The Vienna Convention defines a "jus cogens" or
"peremptory norm" as one "accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character." VCLT, supra note 21, art. 53.
239. See, e.g., KONTOU, supra note 14, at 132-33; MAX SORENSEN, LES SOURCES DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL: ETUDE SUR LA JURISPRUDENCE DE LA COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE
INTERNATIONALE [THE SOURCES OF lNTERNATIONAL LAW: STUDY ON THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE] (1946) (concluding that judges of the Permanent
International Court of Justice tended to treat the sources of law listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the
Permanent International Court of Justice as a hierarchy, thus favoring treaty law over customary
international law).
240. Cf Dinstein, supra note 143, at 426 ( discussing issues associated with a "clash between
two norms ofjus cogens," and concluding that "it may be debatable which one ought to carry the day").
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114 states parties and 45 signatories, 241 and much of its content has been
recognized as customary international law. 242 As it is generally acknowledged
as the definitive description of the law of treaties, it is natural to tum to it to
determine whether treaty modification by subsequently developed customary
international law is permissible. Unfortunately, arguments grounded in the
Vienna Convention are inconclusive, as its text can be read both to forbid and
to permit such modification.

i.

The Im/possibility of Modification by Subsequently
Developed Customary International Law

The Vienna Convention states that "[a] treaty may be amended by
agreement between the parties. The rules laid down [regarding the conclusion
and entry into force of treaties] apply to such an agreement except in so far as
the treaty may otherwise provide." 243 With regards to multilateral treaties,
unless the treaty itself provides otherwise,
Any proposal to amend a multilateral treaty as between all the parties must be
notified to all the contracting States, each one of which shall have the right to take
part in:
(a) The decision as to the action to be taken in regard to such proposal;
(b) The negotiation and conclusion of any agreement for the amendment of the
244
treaty.

Additionally, an "amending agreement does not bind any State already a party
to the treaty which does not become a party to the amending agreement."245
Finally, the International Law Commission-which provided draft articles to
the participants in the Vienna Conference-excluded from its final draft articles
an earlier one that would have permitted treaty modification by "subsequent
emergence of a new rule of customary law relating to matters dealt with in the
treaty and binding on all parties."246
Given this text and history, some might argue that since the Vienna
Convention does not explicitly recognize the possibility of bilateral or
multilateral treaty modification by subsequently developed customary
international law, any such modification is impermissible. To the extent states
appear to believe certain actions that cannot be squared with their treaty
obligations are nonetheless lawful, they are wrong.
One response is that the Vienna Convention was not intended to
241. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties. un.org/PagesNiewDetailsIIT.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no= XXIII-1 &chapter=23&Temp
=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
242. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/1/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited April 11, 2016) (explaining that although the
United States has not ratified the treaty, it "considers many of the provisions of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary international law on the law of treaties").
243. VCLT, supra note 21, art. 39.
244. Id. art. 40(2).
245. Id. art. 40(4).
246. ILC Report, supra note 80, at 236.
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comprehensively describe the law of treaties. 247 The Convention never
mentions the possibility of treaty termination by desuetude or obsolescence, for
example, but both are recognized by states. 248 Like desuetude and
obsolescence, the possibility of modification by subsequently developed
customary international law may remain an element of the uncodified
customary law of treaties.
Alternatively, it may well be that the Vienna Convention articles
governing treaty modification were never intended to be exclusive. It certainly
never expressly forbids modification by subsequently developed customary
international law. And, unlike the rules regarding termination, suspension, or
party withdrawal-all of which "may take place only as a result of the
application of the provisions of the treaty or of the present Convention"249-the
rules regarding amendment and modification do not use exclusionary language.
Accordingly, they might have been intended to describe one of multiple
. 250
poss1'ble routes to treaty mo d'fi
1 1cat10n.
This understanding is bolstered by the reasons given for the International
Law Commission's decision to remove the draft article regarding modification
by subsequently developed customary international law. 251 It was not that they
believed it was impossible for new customary international law to effect a
modification; rather, the Commission "concluded that the question would in
any given case depend to a large extent on the particular circumstances and on
the intentions of the parties to the treaty."252 Furthermore, the Commission
determined "that the question formed part of the general topic of the relation
between customary norms and treaty norms, which is too complex for it to be
safe to deal only with one aspect of it in the present article." 253 By deciding to
remain silent on the relationship between treaty and customary international
law, the Commission did not foreclose the possibility that the latter could
modify the former. 254
247. Int'] Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ,i 427, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006)
[hereinafter !LC Fragmentation Report] (observing that "the Convention does not purport to be an
exhaustive statement of interpretative techniques-there is no mention, for example, of lex specia/is or
lex posterior"); see also SINCLAIR, supra note 128, at 6 (observing that the Convention does not address
agreements between states and international organizations; nonwritten agreements between states; or
questions relating to the succession of treaties, state responsibility, or the effect of the outbreak of
hostilities on treaties); id. at 257 (noting that subjects not covered by the Vienna Convention "will
continue to be regulated by customary law, including any new developments in customary law brought
about by the general practice of States accompanied by the opinio Juris").
248. Marcelo G. Kohen, Desuetude and Obsolescence of Treaties, in THE LAW OF TREATIES
BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION 350, 350 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011 ).
249. VCL T, supra note 21, art. 42 (emphasis added).
250. See VILLIGER, supra note 14, at 200 (suggesting that the Vienna Convention is
comprehensive only to the extent it provides "for all contractual means of terminating and amending
treaties").
251. ILC Report, supra note 80, at 236. The provision was deleted according to a vote of 53 to
15, with 26 abstentions. Akehurst, supra note 14, at 277.
252. ILC Report, supra note 80, at 236.
253. Id.
254. See Akehurst, supra note 14, at 277 (noting that, of the fifty-three votes to delete the draft
article, only ten stated that their vote was based on the belief that the draft provision was not in
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Of course, at a certain point the modification of assorted treaty provisions
may verge on terminating or suspending the treaty as a whole. Interestingly, the
Vienna Convention does recognize the possibility of a treaty becoming void as
a result of subsequently developed customary international law, if such law
qualifies as jus cogens. The Convention provides that, should "a new
peremptory norm of general international law emerge[], any existing treaty
which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates."255
Accordingly, under the Convention, it may well be that treaties may also be
modified by subsequently developed customary international law.
A third rejoinder could be that, to the extent it forbids the modification of
treaties by customary international law, the Vienna Convention itself has since
been modified.2 56 Granted, states have not explicitly recognized the possibility
of treaty modification by subsequently developed customary international law.
But the fact that states have not protested customary modifications when they
do occur may serve as evidence of state practice and opinio Juris sive
necessitatis that such modification is permissible. For example, as discussed in
greater detail below, critics of the argument that a new norm of humanitarian
intervention has modified the U.N. Charter's prohibition on a state's unilateral
use of force tend to argue that no such customary norm has arisen-not that
such a norm could not modify the Charter. 257

ii. Interpretation in Light of Customary International Law
Alternatively, those seeking to reconcile what appears to be treaty
modification by subsequently developed customary international law with the
text of the Vienna Convention may look to Article 31(3)(c), which provides
that, along with a treaty's context, "[a]ny relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties" should be taken into account
when interpreting a treaty. 258 As the ICJ has observed, this would include new '
customary international law: the interpretation of a treaty "cannot remain
unaffected by the subsequent development of law [including] by way of
customary law" 259
While there is a long history of interpreting treaties in light of new
customary international law, this will be a plausible description of what has
accordance with existing law-three thought the relationship between treaty and customary law was
outside the scope of the Convention, eleven said the rule was undesirable, and two advocated deletion
without providing reasons); see also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 12 (3d ed.
2013) (observing that the Commission did not view its mandate as extending to the relationship between
treaty and customary international law).
255. VCLT, supra note 21, art. 64.
256. See Akehurst, supra note 14, at 277 (suggesting this possibility); see also SINCLAIR, supra
note 128, at 257 (observing that customary international law on treaties will continue to develop
alongside the Vienna Convention).
257. See infra Part IV.C.
258. VCLT, supra note 21, art. 31(3)(c).
259. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971
I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 21 ).
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occurred only when the treaty is sufficiently flexible to accommodate these
interpretations. To do otherwise is to modify, not interpret, the treaty. 260 For
example, it requires stretching the treaty beyond the breaking point to read the
1936 London Protocol as permitting the various customary exceptions allowing
submarines to target merchant vessels that later arose. Collectively, the
exceptions permit precisely what the treaty forbade-using submarines to sink
merchant ships, notwithstanding their inability to provide for the safety of the
ship's crew, passengers and papers 261 -and thus they cannot be justified as
gap-filling interpretations in line with the treaty's object and purpose (or text,
or intent of the drafters). Where the new understanding of the states parties'
legal obligations cannot be reconciled with the treaty's object and purpose,
treaty "interpretation" in light of new customary international law is more
accurately described as treaty modification-and in such cases, Article 3l(c)(3)
is inapplicable.
iii. A Fundamental Change in Circumstances
Some consider Article 62, which provides for treaty termination or
withdrawal in light of "a fundamental change in circumstances,"262 as
providing legal justification for treaty termination in light of subsequently
developed customary international law. 263 While the travaux preparatoires
might imply that Article 62 was meant to apply only to changes in factual, and
not legal, circumstances, 264 the treaty certainly allows for a teleological reading
that would permit an interpreter to consider a development in customary
international law "a fundamental change in circumstances."
Article 62, however, includes a number of qualifiers limiting when it may
be invoked. Some hurdles will be relatively easy for new customary
international law to surmount: the change must not have been foreseen, the
prior-existing circumstances must have constituted an essential basis for the
consent of the parties, and the effect of the change must "radically" transform
obligations to be performed. 265 Nor can Article 62 be invoked as the basis for
termination or withdrawal from a treaty establishing a boundary.266 Thus, were
the Vienna Convention in force in the early twentieth century, Turkey and
Egypt could have invoked Article 62 to justify the suspension of the
Capitulatory regimes. To the extent the Panama Canal Treaty established a
boundary, however, Panama might have had more difficulty in doing so.
Most importantly, Article 62 does not apply "[i]f the fundamental change

260. See supra Part II.C.4.
261. See supra note I 91.
262. VCLT, supra note 21, art. 62.
263. See KONTOU, supra note 14, at 32-33 & nn.88-93 (citing scholars).
264. Id. at 34; see also Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Jurisdiction, 1973 I.CJ. 49, ,i 32
(Feb. 2) (noting that "changes in the law may under certain conditions constitute valid grounds for
invoking a change of circumstances affecting the duration of a treaty").
265. VCLT, supra note 21, art. 62(1).
266. Id. art. 62(2)(a).
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is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under
the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the
treaty." 267 A state that contributed to the development of a new norm by
breaching treaty commitments could not then rely on the newly developed
norm to justify a treaty modification under Article 62. However, in the face of
existing law, new contradictory customary international law can develop only
through state breaches. 268 Article 62 therefore seems to create a Catch-22. A
state grounding an action that would otherwise constitute a treaty breach in new
customary international law is contributing to state practice supporting that
law's existence-which, in tum, means that the state cannot invoke it as a
fundamental change in circumstances.

4. Lex Posterior and Lex Specialis
The best doctrinal argument for the possibility of treaty modification by
subsequently developed customary international law is based on the principles
of lex posterior and lex specialis. Not only do they explain why customary
international law may displace treaty law in the absence of universal state party
consent, they also provide guidance as to when certain treaty provisions may
·
269
survive.
Lex posterior derogat legi priori is the principle that the most recently
developed rule prevails over prior law. 270 Domestically, one normative
justification for this principle is that it represents the latest, and thus most
authoritative, statement of a recognized lawmaker. In the international legal
order, where no single state has rulemaking authority, other justificationssuch a~ the fact that the later-in-time law will be more responsive to current
circumstances-----carry more weight. The principle is well-established as "a
principle of interpretation or conflict-solution in international law."271
Despite their differing sources of authority, 272 treaty and customary
international law are considered coequal sources of international legal
obligations. 273 Accordingly, later-in-time customary international law can

267. Id. art. 62(2)(b).
268. See CASSESE, supra note 14, at 157-58 (discussing how breaches based on opinio
necessitatis evolve into breaches based on opinio juris sive necessitatis); see also D' AMATO, supra note
20, at 97-98; VlLLIGER, supra note 14, at 210.
269. This Subsection presents a simplified analysis of these two principles; in practice, their
application will require a nuanced analysis. Hans Aufricht, Supersession of Treaties in International
Law, 37 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 700 (1952); see also ILC Fragmentation Conclusions, supra note 9, at
409.
270. The substantive content of the later-in-time norm is irrelevant to the question of whether it
has displaced pre-existing treaty text. While the substantive content may increase the likelihood of a
norm's evolution into customary international law, it is a problematic basis for its legitimacy. As
evidenced by many debates in international human rights law, the weight assigned to various substantive
norms can vary greatly from culture to culture, state to state, or even from person to person.
271. ILC Fragmentation Report, supra note 247, 'l) 225.
272. See supra note 19.
273. See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 14, at 154; KONTOU, supra note 14, at 23; Bos, supra note
14, at 33 7 (describing treaty and custom as "intrinsically equivalent"); Philip R. Trimble, A Revisionist
View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 669 (1986) ("Conventional doctrine
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displace an earlier treaty provision as the binding lex posterior. 274 For example,
to the extent customary norms deriving from Additional Protocol I and
subsequent state conduct expanded states parties' legal obligations under the
Fourth Geneva Convention, they appear to have done so as lex posterior.
Meanwhile, lex specialis derogat legi generali is the principle that, when
two laws govern the same factual situation, a law governing the specific subject
matter overrides a law governing the general matter. The lex specialis principle
is justified on the grounds that the more concrete and specialized law "often
takes better account of the particular features of the context in which it is to be
applied than any applicable general law," "[i]ts application may often create a
more equitable result," and "it may often better reflect the intent of the legal
subjects."275 Thus, in certain situations, subsequently developed customary
international law may supplant treaty law as both the lex posterior and as the
lex specia/is. 276 This appears to be what occurred in submarine warfare: the
new customary exceptions were both later-in-time and more specific than the
preexisting treaty text.
Of the few scholars who have considered the issue, Mark Villiger is the
strongest proponent of this approach. He argues that "the formation of a new
customary rule implies desuetude of the original conventional rule . ... In other
words, inherent in the formation of a new customary rule is the obligation that
the incompatible conventional rule is no longer applied and, hence, ceases to
exist. " 277 His reasoning, however, is grounded in the assumption that customary
international law requires "uniform"-and not generalized-state practice, and
so his argument is circular: customary international law can modify only a
treaty provision that states have uniformly stopped enforcing, 278 which would
erase the distinction between subsequent practice evidencing agreement to a
modification and modification by subsequently developed customary
international law. 279

regards both types of law as equally authoritative."); Weil, supra note 231, at 423; Christopher
Greenwood,
Sources
of
International
Law:
An
Introduction
(2008),
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/Greenwood_outline.pdf; Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. (Nov. 2006), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil
/9780199231690/law-9780 I 99231690-e 1393#law-978019923 I 690-e 1393-div 1-5; see also AUST, supra
note 254, at 12 ("International law does not contain any principle of acte contraire, by which a rule can
be altered only by a rule of the same legal nature."); VILLIGER, supra note 14, at 59 (same).
Article 38 of the !CJ Statute, which is widely regarded as the most authoritative description of
the sources of international law, lists "international conventions" before "international custom." Statute
of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. However,
most scholars agree that this listing does not establish a hierarchy among these sources. See, e.g., JORGE
CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 227 (Leland M. Goodrich & William
T.R. Fox eds., Alba Amoia trans., 1969); VILLIGER, supra note 14, at 57-58.
274. See CASSESE, supra note 14, at 154; KONTOU, supra note 14, at 20, 23; VLLLIGER, supra
note 14, at 59-60; Bos, supra note 14, at 33 7.
275. !LC Fragmentation Conclusions, supra note 9, at 409.
276. CASSESE, supra note 14, at 154; VILLIGER, supra note 14, at 59,207; Bos, supra note 14,
at 337.
277. VILLIGER, supra note 14, at 206.
278. See id.
279. See supra Part lll.A.5.
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This Article's analysis is more radical, in that it presumes that customary
international law may modify a treaty even without universal acceptance of the
new customary rule. 280 Villiger's account still gives deference to state consent,
insofar as he presumes that a treaty cannot be modified by subsequently
developed customary international law absent universal agreement; in contrast,
this Article argues that one of the benefits of such modification is that absolute
agreement is not necessary, thereby dispensing with the holdout problem
inherent to treaty modification under the Vienna Convention's consent-based
rules. Accordingly, because a single state will not be able to prevent action
supported by a supermajority of members of the international legal order, treaty
modification by subsequently developed customary international law may
sometimes hew more closely to the international consensus, if one exists, than
consent-based forms of treaty modification.
A proponent for the superiority of treaty text might attempt to tackle
customary international law on its own terms and claim that the treaty provision
should be viewed as evidence of the states parties' "persistent objection" to the
development of a customary international law norm. While treaty law is an
"opt-in" system, customary international law has a limited "opt-out" element.
Theoretically, as a norm evolves into controlling custom, a state may avoid
becoming bound by steadfastly contesting the norm's existence or its status as
customary international law. The United States might have argued that its treaty
with Panama regarding the Panama Canal, for example, eviden_ced its objection
to the developing norms of certain sovereign state rights. However, in the
absence of other state action contesting the subsequently developed customary
norm, asserting prior-existing treaty text alone is unlikely to be recognized as a
persistent objection, especially in the face of a principle supported by a
majority of states in the international community. 281
A better argument for why treaty law sometimes survives is one based in
lex specialis. Usually, lex specialis is presumed to prevail over lex genera/is,
even when the more general law is also lex posterior. 282 In some situations,
new customary international law will still be lex genera/is. Meanwhile, certain
treaties-and particularly bilateral treaties-may be intended to describe the
specific legal rights or obligations of states, notwithstanding a changing
customary backdrop. 283 When in conflict with a broad customary international
280. Cf TLC Fragmentation Conclusions, supra note 9, at 416 (stating that the lex posterior
principle cannot be applied in treaty law when parties to a subsequent treaty are not identical to the
parties of an earlier treaty).
This Article's position implicitly adopts an understanding of international legal agreements as
more akin to domestic legislation (where the lex posterior applies) than consent-based contract law
(where lex prior will prevail). Cf !LC Fragmentation Report, supra note 247, ,i 226 n.296, ,i 241.
281. See David A. Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?, 61 WASH. L. REV.
957, 967 (1986).
282. See CASSESE, supra note 14, at 154; Bos, supra note 14, at 337; see also !LC
Fragmentation Report, supra note 247, ,i 61 (discussing how lex specia/is is generally accepted as "a
valid maxim of interpretation or conflict-solution technique in public international law"). But see
KONTOU, supra note 14, at 24 & n.37 (citing scholars who believe that "lex posterior always repeals the
lex prior, even if the prior rule is more specific").
283. See Special Rapporteur for the Law of Treaties, Sixth Rep. on the Law of Treaties, Int'!
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law norm that applies to all states, these treaty obligations may survive as lex
specia/is. This might explain why Canada exempted France, which enjoyed the
right to fish in Canadian territorial waters under a 1904 treaty, from its 1964
Act extending its exclusive fishing zone in accordance with changed customary
norms. 284
Additionally, the nature and content of a treaty may affect whether it is
likely to ever be modified by subsequently developed customary international
law. Treaties constitutive of an international organization, treaties establishing
boundaries, and perhaps even treaties on certain subject matters are unlikely to
be altered by subsequently developed customary international law, simply
because states are unlikely to engage in the conflicting conduct necessary to
establish a new norm.
When there is a question as to whether a specific treaty provision has
been automatically superseded by subsequently developed customary
international law, the states involved would ideally address the issue directly,
as did the parties to the Capitulatory regimes. Nancy Kontou suggests four
requirements for when a new norm of customary international law may be
invoked as grounds for treaty modification:
(i) it is incompatible with the treaty provisions;
(ii) it is different from the customary international law in force at the time of the
conclusion of the treaty; and
(iii) it is binding upon all parties to the treaty, unless
(iv) the parties intended that the treaty should continue applying as special law. 285

In determining what the parties intend, "what counts is the practice followed
inter se by the parties to the treaty." 286 A state's conduct with respect to
nonmember states and other states' conduct "may give rise to a rule of
customary law, but such a rule has no effect on the treaty unless it is followed
by parties to the treaty in their relations with one another." 287
Presumably, Kontou would place the burden of proof for these elements
on the party arguing for treaty modification. Doing so, however, would not pay
appropriate deference to the fact that there is no hierarchy between treaty and
customary international law. Accordingly, in cases of disagreement, the burden
is more appropriately assumed by the party claiming that the treaty should

Law Comm 'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/186 & Add.1-7 (Mar. 11, Mar. 25, Apr. 12, May 11, May 17, May 24,
June I, June 14, I 966) (by Humphrey Waldock), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'] L. Comm'n 51, 90-91,
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add. l ("The very object of a bilateral treaty or of a treaty between a small group
of States is not infrequently to set up a special legal regime between the States concerned and sometimes
a regime which derogates from the existing customary law. Accordingly, to say that the emergence of a
new rule of customary law, binding on the parties as a general rule, is necessarily to modify the
particular relations which they have set up between them may defeat their intention."); see also Dinstein,
supra note 143, at 405.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
285. KONTOU, supra note 14, at 146.
286. Akehurst, supra note 14, at 276.
287. Id.
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remain in force as lex specialis. 288 In most situations, this burden will be
relatively easy to meet. 289

*****
As constitutive multilateral treaties age and new customary international
law develops, subsequently developed customary international law will
sometimes modify states' treaty obligations. There are a number of unsatisfying
arguments for and against such treaty modification. Consent theory and the
"battle of norms" theory cannot adequately explain how treaty and customary
international law interact in practice. The Vienna Convention is inconclusive: it
can be read both to forbid and to permit such modification.
The best doctrinal argument for why such modification can occur is
grounded in the lex posterior and lex specialis principles. Not only do they
explain why customary international law may legitimately displace treaty law
in the absence of universal state party consent, but they also provide guidance
as to when certain treaties may survive. And, as discussed in the following Part,
in some cases modification by subsequently developed customary international
law may better reflect the consensus of the international community than
consent-based means of treaty modification.
IV.

MORE CONSENSUAL THAN CONSENT

Much of this Article has been devoted to demonstrating that treaties have
been modified by subsequently developed customary international law and
arguing that such modifications are legitimate. But while it is relatively easy to
identify examples of such modification in retrospect, a state wishing to act
contrary to accepted understandings of its treaty obligations can rarely point to
well-established, conflicting customary international law. Instead, assuming it
wishes to act lawfully and that formal modification is infeasible, the state is
faced with a choice between advancing an adaptive interpretation (which might
actually work a modification) and arguing that an emerging norm has ripened
into new customary international law and modified the treaty.2 90
Adaptive interpretations derive their authority from their presumed
fidelity to the treaty, and by extension, to state consent. But, in practice, a state
arguing for an adaptive interpretation of a treaty actually has great leeway in
justifying a highly controversial action. In contrast, a state grounding its legal
arguments in the existence of a new norm of customary international law will

288. PAUWEL YN, supra note 228, at 141.
289. Id. at 141-42.
290. Alternatively, of course, a state might decide to act, notwithstanding the fact that it has no
legal justification. It must then determine how to present its violation. One option is to simply ignore the
law; the other is to acknowledge the violation but describe it as a contribution to the evolution of a new
customary international law. While either approach equally works a violation and may be equally
precedential, there are nonetheless important distinctions between them. See, e.g., Andre Nollkaemper,
Syria Ins/a-Symposium: Andre Nollkaemper-lntervention in Syria and International Law: Inside or
Out, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. I, 2013, 3:00 AM), opiniojuris.org/2013/09/01/syria-insta-symposium-andrenollkaemper-intervention-syria-international-law-inside (discussing these distinctions in the context of
the Syrian situation).
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have to both demonstrate and engage in cooperative, consensus-building
activity. Thus, counterintuitively, arguments justifying state conduct apparently
in conflict with a treaty are more likely to reflect the generalized agreement of
the international community when based on modification by a new norm of
customary international law than when they are based on a new adaptive
interpretation.
This Part uses the proposed U.S. unilateral use of force in Syria as a case
study to tease out the relative benefits and drawbacks of these different
justifications for state action in apparent breach of a treaty obligation. At the
outset, it is worth noting that this is an unusual case study: The treaty in
question is the U.N. Charter, one of the most constitutive treaties in the
international legal order, and one with its own supremacy article. 291 The
provision purportedly modified is Article 2(4)'s prohibition on the threat or use
of force, which many believe to be jus cogens. If there was ever a high bar for
treaty modification by subsequently developed customary international law,
this is it.
As a result, and unsurprisingly, most scholars considering this case
study-including myself-would agree that the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention has not modified Article 2(4), 292 and so an argument for
intervention grounded in modification by subsequently developed customary
international law fails. But this actually underscores the normative point of this
Article. A state wishing to intervene contrary to the text of Article 2(4) cannot
justify its actions as lawful under an adaptive interpretation of Article 2( 4)
permitting humanitarian intervention-which fails the smile test---or on the
claim that subsequently developed customary international law has modified
the Charter. However, a state proffering an adaptive interpretation will be more
likely to take action, and thus more likely to act contrary to the international
consensus, than a state constrained by the need to demonstrate sufficient state
practice and opinio juris sive necessitatis to justify its claim.

291. U.N. Charter art. 103 (providing that, in the event of a conflict between the Charter and
other international agreements, Charter obligations will prevail). However, it is worth noting that Article
103's supremacy announcement does not extend to customary international law. Cf Dinstein, supra note
143, at 418 (noting that although "the Charter prevails over any previous inconsistent custom," it is less
clear what the effect of later custom at odds with the Charter would be).
292. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Present Problems of the Use of Force in International
Law,
72
ANNUAIRE
DE
L'lNSTITUT
DE
DROIT
INTERNATIONAL
263
(2007),
http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiF/annuaireF/2007/Reisman.pdf ("[T]here is no basis for unilateral
Humanitarian Intervention in contemporary international law."); id. at 266 (noting that establishing a
"general right of Humanitarian Intervention" would be "a radical challenge to settled international
law"); Michael Reisman, INSTITUT DE OROIT INTERNATIONAL 25-26 (May 26, 2015),
http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/annuaireE/2015/101 IO_Commission_Recent_Cases_of_Humanitarian
_Intervention_May_26_2015_wmr.pdf (reconsidering the Commission's conclusions in light of nine
subsequent cases and concluding that "while some unilateral actions may have received a degree of
informal or post hoc approval, practice indicates that the international community continues to view
unilateral Humanitarian Interventions undertaken without the authorization of the United Nations
Security Council as presumptively unlawful").
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Case Study: Unilateral U.S. Intervention in Syria

Since early 2011, Syria has been embroiled in a devastating internal
armed conflict between the Assad regime and assorted opposition forces. On
August 21, 2013, rockets carrying the nerve agent sarin struck oppositioncontrolled or disputed areas of the Ghouta suburbs near Damascus. 293 The
Violations Documentation Centre, using internationally accepted norms to
verify deaths, established that at least 588 individuals were killed in the attack,
including 108 children. 294 A preliminary U.S. government assessment
estimated that 1,429 individuals were killed, including 426 children. 295
Ten days later, President Obama announced that he had determined that
"the United States should take military action against Syrian regime targets," in
no small part because the sarin attack made a "mockery of the global
prohibition on the use of chemical weapons." 296 Obama also noted that he was
"comfortable going forward without the approval of a United Nations Security
Council that, so far, has been completely paralyzed and unwilling to hold Assad
accountable. " 297
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides: "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 298 The Charter includes
two exceptions to this general prohibition: states may take action pursuant to a
Security Council resolution or in self-defense. 299 In the absence of either
exception, Obama's threatened military action appeared tantamount to an
announcement that the United States intended to violate Article 2(4). 300
White House counsel Kathryn Ruemmler acknowledged that the
Administration's threatened use of force "may not fit under a traditionally
recognized legal basis under international law." 301 However, she also stated
that, given the situation, it would nonetheless be "justified and legitimate under
international law." 302 When pressed on whether the Administration's position
was that such intervention would be "illegal but legitimate"-as NATO's
bombing of Kosovo is famously described 303-as paraphrased by one
293. Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know, BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013, 5:46 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23927399.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Office of the Press Sec'y, Statement by the President on Syria, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 31,
2013 ), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/3 I /statement-president-syria.
297. Id.
298. Id. art 2, ,r 4.
299. Id. arts. 42, 5 I.
300. Indeed, Obama's statement was itself a violation, as Article 2(4) prohibits threats of force
as well as uses of force. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
301. Charlie Savage, Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2013, at Al (internal quotation marks omitted).
302. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
303. INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON Kos., THE Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 4 (2000).
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commentator, she responded, "[I]t would be legal under international law
because of the constellation of factors presented by the situation. " 304 The
Administration's otherwise unelaborated legal position sparked a heated legal
and policy debate. Many-including Russian President Vladimir Putin in a
New York Times op-ed-observed that it boiled down to the absurdity that the
United States could violate international law to punish Syria for violating
international law. 305
Due to internal political resistance to intervention and Russia's diplomatic·
solution-whereby the Assad regime signed the Convention on Chemical
Weapons and agreed to tum over its chemical stockpiles to the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for destruction-the United States did
not take its threatened military action. Consequently, the Obama
Administration has not provided any further clarification of why it believed
such intervention would not violate Article 2(4). But, in the absence of a
Charter amendment,3 06 scholars hypothesizing about the Administration's
possible legal reasoning focus on two main possibilities: one based on adaptive
interpretation, and one based on Charter modification by a new norm of
humanitarian intervention-in other words, by subsequently developed
customary international law. 307 The remainder of this Part explores the stakes
and implications of these two arguments.

B.

Unilateral Adaptive Interpretation

The United Kingdom is the only state to have provided its legal analysis
as to why unilateral military intervention in Syria would be lawful. 308 Its

304. Charlie Savage, Comment to White House Counsel Announces Syria Strike Would Not
Violate International Law, But Doesn't Explain How, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 9, 2013, 5:48 PM),
http://opini ojuri s. org/2 0 13/09/09/white-house-counsel-announces-syria-stri ke-vi o late-international-law
-doesnt-explain (clarifying Ruemmler's description of the Obama Administration's position).
305. Vladimir V. Putin, Opion., A Plea for Caution from Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2013, at
A31; see also Paul Campos, Striking Syria Is Completely Illegal, TIME Sept. 5, 2013,
http ://ideas. time.com/2013/09/05/obamas-p Ian-for-interventi on-i n-syria-is-i Ilegal.
306. Under a strict reading of Article 2(4), any form of unilateral military intervention-even if
for humanitarian purposes-would be lawful only if the Charter was formally amended.
307. Cf THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND
ARMED ATTACKS 139 (2002) (suggesting that post-Charter state practice suggests either that the
Charter's prohibition on the use of force has been modified by a "graduated reinterpretation" or by the
"evolution of a subsidiary adjectival international law of mitigation"); Anthea Roberts, legality vs
Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force Be I/legal But Justified?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION, AND THE
USE OF FORCE 179, 196-97 (Philip Alston & Euan Macdonald eds., 2008).
Other possible arguments, usually based on various iterations of self-defense and consent, have
been proposed, but by and large these have not gained traction. For an optimistic summary, see Jordan
Paust, US Use of Limited Force in Syria Can Be lawful Under the UN Charter, JURIST-FORUM (Sept.
10, 2013, 11 :00 AM), http://jurist.org/forum/2013/09/jordan-paust-force-syria.php. For more reserved
assessments, see Michael N. Schmitt, The Syrian Intervention: Assessing the Possible International law
Justifications, 89 INT'L L. STUD. 744 (2013); Kenneth Anderson, legality of Intervention in Syria in
Response to Chemical
Weapon Attacks,
17
ASIL
INSIGHTS
(Aug.
30,
2013),
http://www.as iI. org/ins ights/vo lume/ I 7/issue/21 /legality-intervention-syri a-response-chemical-weapon
-attacks.
308. See Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime-U.K. Government legal Position, PRIME
MINlSTER'S OFF. (Aug. 28, 2013), http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2013/images/08/29/chemica1-weapon-use
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reasoning is best understood as an adaptive, gap-filling interpretation of Article
2(4)'s general prohibition on the unilateral use of force, intended to address the
situation where there is great humanitarian need and the Security Council
refuses to take remedial action. 309
The U.K. statement provides that, "[i]f action in the Security Council is
blocked, the UK would still be permitted under international law to take
exceptional measures in order to alleviate the scale of the overwhelmingly
humanitarian catastrophe in Syria."310 These "exceptional measures" would
only be permissible where three conditions were met: (1) "there is convincing
evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of
extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent
relief'; (2) it is "objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the
use of force iflives are to be saved"; and (3) "the proposed use of force must be

-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position.pdf [hereinafter U.K. Statement].
309. Many-including some current and former U.K. officials----describe the U.K. Statement as
being grounded in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 307, at 754
(relying on the U.K. statement as evidence that the U.K. government has "officially embraced the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention as providing a legal ground for operations against Syria"); Joshua
Rozenberg, Syria Intervention: It May Not Be Wise, But Using Force May Be Lawful, GUARDIAN (Aug.
28, 2013, 8:20 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/aug/28/syria-intervention-force-lawful
(quoting Sir Daniel Bethlehem, QC, the former principal legal adviser to the U.K. Foreign Office, as
stating that "the UK has been consistent in maintaining the existence of a narrowly defined right to act"
in cases of great humanitarian need).
However, the United Kingdom has not clarified whether the understanding that intervention for
humanitarian purposes is lawful because it is in keeping with an expansive interpretation of the U.N.
Charter or because a new norm of customary international law has modified the Charter. Given this
silence, the absence of support for its claim with references to opinio juris sive necessitatis or existing
state practice, and the United Kingdom's failure to take consensus-building action to build recognition
for the new norm, it seems most accurate to characterize the United Kingdom's position as an adaptive
interpretation.
Academics have also proposed adaptive interpretations of Article 2(4) to claim that unilateral
military intervention in Syria could be lawful. See, e.g., GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL, THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 27 (2012) (noting that humanitarian intervention
might not violate Article 2(4) "because the purpose is not to affect the territorial integrity or political
independence of the state"); Anthony D' Amato, Comment to Punitive Military Strikes on Syria Risk an
Inhumane Intervention, OUPBLOG (Sept. 2, 2013, 9: 19 PM), http://blog.oup.com/2013/09/syria-us-military
-strikes-international-law-pi! ("A unilateral missile strike against Syria in [retaliation] for its use of
chemical weapons against its own civilians, is not a use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of Syria, in the terms of Article 2(4)."); Jan Hurd, Syria Ins/a-Symposium: Ian
Hurd-On Law, Policy, and (Not) Bombing Syria, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 31, 2013, 12:30 PM),
http://opin iojuris. org/20 13/08/3 I /syria-i nsta-symposium-ian-hurd-dont-bom b-assad-even-1 egal
(suggesting a "substantive reinterpretation" of the Charter to permit "the use of force on humanitarian
grounds in certain extremely grave circumstances"); Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of
Humanitarian Intervention, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://justsecurity.org/1506/koh-syria
-part2 (arguing that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter should not be read as prohibiting limited and
genuine humanitarian intervention in the face of Security Council deadlock); Paust, supra note 307
(noting the "clearly malleable nature of the [Charter's] text").
These arguments echo similar ones made with regard to the Kosovo bombings, which have not
been generally accepted by states or the majority of scholars. See Roberts, supra note 307, at 185-88
(describing and debunking arguments that unilateral humanitarian intervention would not breach Article
2(4)); Dapo Akande, The Legality of Military Action in Syria: Humanitarian Intervention and
Responsibility to Protect, EJTL: TALK! (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/humanitarian-intervention
-responsibil ity-to-protect-and-the-legality-of-military-action-in-syria/ (describing such interpretations as
"strained" and "inconsistent with subsequent practice ... and also with the drafting history").
310. U.K. Statement, supra note 308.
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necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian need and must
be strictly limited in time and scope to this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to
achieve that end and for no other purpose)."311 It then concludes that all three
of these criteria are satisfied with regards to the Syrian crisis. 312
As discussed above, interpretations of constitutive treaties like the
Charter must be in line with their object and purpose, and new interpretations
are only legitimate if accepted by all states parties. The bar is even higher for
interpretations which actually seem to work modifications of significant
articles, as the U.K. reasoning appears to do. However, given the lack of an
authoritative interpreter of the Charter, individual states are free to propose
interpretations and act on them. Thus, the United Kingdom could unilaterally
intervene in Syria for humanitarian purposes without awaiting international
approval of its interpretation. 313
The normative issue with such adaptive interpretation is readily apparent:
it permits unilateral state action based on an idiosyncratic interpretation, which
ultimately might not be acceptable to other states parties to the treaty. If the
interpretation is not accepted, the only action other states can take is to protest
it. But, by the time other states parties react, the original state may have already
taken action based, in good or bad faith, on its idiosyncratic interpretation. If
other states parties protest enough, the action may later be determined to be
unlawful-but the clock cannot be rolled back, and the state that acted on an
unapproved interpretation is unlikely to be punished. 314
Thus, in a legal system without an overarching independent enforcement
authority and where some states are more equal than others, the primary benefit
associated with adaptive interpretation-its presumed fidelity to the object and
the purpose of the treaty, as described in its text-may not always be reflected
in state conduct. Powerful states and rogue states are relatively free to advance
and act on "interpretations" of treaties that actually serve their private interests
with little fear of consequences. Russia and the United States, among others,
have been harshly critiqued for justifying their actions based on such

311. Id. Michael Schmitt argues for a possible fourth criterion: "[T]he intervention must be
likely to significantly alleviate the suffering to a degree not possible through non-forceful measures."
Schmitt, supra note 307, at 754-55.
312. U.K. Statement, supra note 308.
313. It did not do so, however, as the U.K. Parliament voted against such intervention. Syrian
Crisis: Cameron Loses Commons Vote on Syria Action, BBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2013, 6: 13 PM),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-23892783.
314. Violations of international law are rarely formally adjudicated, especially as the !CJ, the
primary international tribunal, has jurisdiction only over those states that have accepted its mandatory
authority-which does not include China, Russia, the United States, and other major international
actors. David A. Koplow, Indisputable Violations: What Happens When the United States
Unambiguously Breaches a Treaty?, 37 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 53, 54-55 (2013). Additionally,
while the U.N. Security Council can resolve certain disputes between states, the Permanent Member's
veto power protects them and their allies from judgment. Id. at 55. Finally, the decisions of the "court of
world public opinion," id., are often muddled, biased (as powerful states and their allies are vocal
contributors), and less relevant to powerful or isolated states that may care less about reputational costs
or sanctions. See Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and
International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 253, 340-42 (2011 ).
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"interpretations. " 315
The United States could rely on a good-faith adaptive interpretation of
Article 2(4), like that proposed by the United Kingdom, as justification for
unilateral humanitarian intervention. And it might do so with the best of
intentions. 316 But, if it were to do so and if its interpretation were not widely
accepted-as is likely to be the case, given the international community's and
international law scholars' lackluster response to the U.K. statement-the
United States would risk perpetuating its reputation as a superpower above the
law. Additionally, to the extent such U.S. action encourages other states to base
actions on similarly idiosyncratic interpretations, the stability of the
international legal system as a whole would be undermined.
C.

Consensus-Building Modification by Customary International Law

Numerous scholars argue that unilateral military intervention in Syria
would be lawful under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. 317 This
doctrine is related to, but distinct from, the concept of the Responsibility to
Protect (R2P). R2P might be summarized as follows: a state has the primary
responsibility for protecting its population from genocide, crimes against
humanity, and other such atrocities. However, sometimes the state itself is the
perpetrator of these atrocities. In such situations, the international community
has an obligation to use the means at its disposal-which might include
diplomatic, economic, and even military action-to stop the perpetrator state
from harming its civilians. But where R2P requires Security Council
authorization for the use of force, 318 the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
315. See, e.g., Chris Borgen, Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Crimea: The Legal Rhetoric of
Intervention, Recognition, and Annexation, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 2, 2014, 8:04 PM),
http:// opin i ojuri s. org/2 0 14/04/02/kosovo-south-ossetia-cri mea-1 ega I-rhetoric-interven ti on-reco gn iti on
-annexation ("While Russia deploys legal language, increasingly they are not the concepts of
international law as generally accepted. Rather, Russia is building a revisionist conception of
international law to serve its foreign policy needs . . . ."); Koplow, supra note 314, at 55 ("U.S.
arguments that waterboarding was not 'torture,' for example, or that 'extraordinary rendition' was
legally permissible, failed the international laugh test.").
316. See e.g., Koh, supra note 309.
317. See, e.g., Jennifer Trahan, Syria Ins/a-Symposium: Jennifer Trahan-The Legality of a
U.S. Strike on Syria, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 31, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/08/31/syriainsta-symposium-jennifer-trahan-legality-u-s-strike-syria; Viewpoints: Is There A Legal Basis For
Military Intervention in Syria?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world23847169 (statements of Geoffrey Robertson and Sigrun Skogly); see also Humanitarian Intervention in
Syria: The Legal Basis, at 111, PUB. INT'L L. & POL'Y GRP. (July 2012),
http ://pubIi c international lawandpo licygroup. org/wp-content/up loads/20 12/08/P!LPG-The- Legal-Basis
-for-Humanitarian-Intervention-in-Syria.pd[ (arguing that "the international community-either through
a regional coalition or a coalition of the willing-has a right under customary international law to use
force in Syria for the limited purpose of stopping atrocity crimes, provided that the force is narrowly
tailored to accomplishing this humanitarian goal").
318. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, "ii 139 (Sept. 16, 2005) (noting that the
international community, as represented through the United Nations, has the responsibility to protect
populations from certain atrocities, and that "we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely a
decisive manner, through Security Council, in accordance with the Charter" (emphasis added)); see also
Mark Kersten, Syria Ins/a-Symposium: Mark Kersten-Whose R2P Is It? The Responsibility to Protect
Post-Syria, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 3, 2013, 2:08 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/03/syria-insta-symposi
um-mark-kersten-whose-r2p-responsibility-protect-post-syria (distinguishing between R2P as a
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would permit states to take unilateral action to stop an ongoing mass atrocity. 319
Thus, although they rarely describe it as such, proponents of the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention as a justification for intervention in Syria are
essentially arguing that a recently arisen customary norm modifies Article
2(4)'s general prohibition on unilateral uses offorce. 320
One obvious benefit to relying on the doctrine is that a state is freed from
both the verbal gymnastics associated with justifying an adaptive
"interpretation" that actually works a modification and from seeking the
consent of all states parties to the treaty. Instead of attempting to explain how
Article 2(4)'s apparent blanket prohibition on the use of unilateral force
without Security Council's authorization was never meant to apply to
humanitarian interventions, arguments that treaty obligations have been
modified by subsequently developed customary international law need
demonstrate only the existence of the new norm.
The drawback for a state relying on this approach, however, is that the
desired norm is unlikely to be established customary international law-which
is the case with the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Pre-1945 evidence of
humanitarian interventions are largely irrelevant, as the Charter was intended to
end all such unilateral policing and place responsibility for such actions with
the Security Council. 321 And many post-1945 interventions, now cited as
evidence of growing consensus around the norm, were primarily grounded in
other legal justifications. 322 Nor does NATO's 1999 bombing campaign in
Kosovo serve as evidence of an established norm. First, states and scholars at
the time emphasized that it was sui generis and not intended to serve as legal
precedent for future actions. 323 Additionally, while there are some parallels
between the Kosovo and Syrian situations, there are also a number of
significant differences: the former Yugoslavia had failed to comply with U.N.
Security Council resolutions; the decision to use force was made by a coalition
of states with regional ties to the crisis; and it occurred before the World

normative "package of ideals" and a legal doctrine).
319. See Shane Reeves, To Russia with Love: How Moral Arguments for a Humanitarian
Intervention in Syria Opened the Door for an Invasion of the Ukraine, 23 MICH. ST. INT'L L. REV. 202204 (2014); see also Eve Massingham, Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes: Does the
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine Advance the Legality of the Use of Force for Humanitarian Ends?, 91
lNT'L REV. RED CROSS 803 (2009) (discussing the history of R2P and distinctions between it and the
older doctrine of humanitarian intervention).
320. See Reeves, supra note 319, at 205 (noting that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is
"generally understood as the same controversial 'third' exception to the rule of nonintervention
established in Article 2(4)").
321. See FRANCK, supra note 307, at 136 (noting that the possibility of exceptions to the
prohibition on the use of force for unilateral humanitarian action was discussed during the drafting of the
Charter but not incorporated in its text); Massingham, supra note 319, at 818.
322. Roberts, supra note 307, at 181; see also Massingham, supra note 319, at 810-15
(reviewing pre- and post-Charter interventions arguably for humanitarian purposes, and concluding that
there is still no consensus as to its legality as an independent justification for military action).
323. See Jack Goldsmith, The Kosovo Precedent for Syria lsn 't Much of a Precedent, LA WF ARE
(Aug. 24, 2013, 8:02 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/the-kosovo-precedent-for-syria-isnt-much
-of-a-precedent.
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Summit clarified that R2P was lawful only with Security Council approval. 324
Most importantly, the Kosovo intervention was far from generally approved;
indeed, the decision to restrict R2P military interventions to actions endorsed
by the Security Council "was a deliberate move by states who, far from
celebrating the new humanitarianism that the United States and NATO believed
they found in the 1999 Kosovo intervention, were gravely worried by it." 325
To the extent that there is general agreement that the international
community has a legal duty to protect citizens from an abusive government, it
stops with R2P-and the ability for an individual state to use force to fulfill
such a duty remains contingent on Security Council authorization. 326 Thus, the
United States cannot justify unilateral military action in Syria under the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. 327
A state seeking to establish new customary international law could
nonetheless take action to promote its development. With regard to the case
study, the United States could publically recognize the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention as a guiding norm and encourage its partners and allies to do
likewise. It could seek to develop evidence of opinio Juris sive necessitatis
through a variety of channels. For example, in the face of a deadlocked
Security Council, the United States could campaign for a recommendation from
the U.N. General Assembly pursuant to the Uniting for Peace resolution. 328
Finally, it could violate its Charter obligations with the purpose of promoting
the evolution of the law, ideally with a coalition of other states. 329 Granted,
many of these norm-building strategies are politically infeasible, but this-and
the fact that the United States itself has not formally recognized the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention-highlights a lack of internal and international
consensus regarding whether the existence of such a law would be a net benefit
or net loss.
While states justifying violations of treaty obligations on the basis of
subsequently developed customary international law are freed from the textual
chains associated with adaptive interpretations, they are constrained in other,
324. See also id. (listing similarities and differences).
325. Anderson, supra note 307.
326. See supra note 292.
327. See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 319, at 224 ("A use of force justified under the concept of
humanitarian intervention is a clear violation of the U.N. Charter and is without the force of law");
Akande, supra note 309 ("[O]ne would need very strong evidence of acceptance of a customary rule
that modifies the prohibition of the use of force in Art. 2(4). We are very far from that."); Deborah
Pearlstein, Not Even the Brits Can Make the Case Bombing Syria is Lawful, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 30,
2013, I 0:24 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/08/30/even-brits-can-make-case-bombing-syria-lawful
("With great respect to my friends and colleagues who hold a different view, there is no 'doctrine of
humanitarian intervention."'). But see Schmitt, supra note 307, at 753 ("[I]t can be fairly argued that the
right has crystallized into customary law over the past decades."); id. at 755 (concluding that the United
States could adopt humanitarian intervention as a legal rationale for strikes in Syria).
328. Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc.
NI 775 (Nov. 3, I 950) (resolving that, should the Security Council fail to act in response to a threat to
the peace, the General Assembly may consider the matter and make recommendations to Members for
collective measures, "including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed
force when necessary").
329. See Nollkaemper, supra note 290.
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more productive ways. As evidenced by the Syrian example, even the most
politically or militarily powerful state cannot rely on this form of modification
without significant, credible proof that the new law has been established. No
single state, acting alone, can justify actions in violation of treaty obligations as
lawfully based on customary international law, as it will need to demonstrate
generalized state practice on the subject and some evidence of opinio Juris sive
necessitatis. This will be relatively easy in certain circumstances, as with the
Capitulatory or Panama Canal treaties. But where the norm has not yet evolved
into customary international law, there are no lawful grounds for claiming that
the treaty has been modified. To prove that the desired norm is actually
customary international law, the state wishing to act contrary to its treaty
obligations will need to engage in cooperative, coalition-building action to
convince most-if not all---of the "audience" that the new norm should be
customary international law. 330 To the extent other states support the traditional
treaty obligation, however, the norm is unlikely to be recognized as a legitimate
grounds for taking action in conflict with the treaty obligation. Thus,
ultimately, a state grounding its legal justification for an action in conflict with
its treaty obligation must respect the international community's consensus more
than a state employing an adaptive interpretation.

D. A Useful Constraint
Why would states elect to argue that a new customary international law
norm has developed when doing so might prevent them from taking the action
they (purportedly) wish to take? Wouldn't it be simpler to advance an adaptive
interpretation and act on it? As one commentator to this piece noted, this seems
akin to trying to scratch an itch on your right ear with your left hand-it's
easier to just use your right hand.
First, states might sometimes prefer creating an international legal
obligation as customary international law rather than as a purported adaptive
interpretation of treaty law, especially when the former's design offers
competitive advantages. 331 One of customary international law's fundamental
characteristics is that, even if it is only generally accepted, it is universally
applicable. As alluded to above, 332 it thereby provides a means by which the
international legal order can address the holdout problem inherent to any
system grounded solely on state consent. 333 Furthermore, customary

330. Hakimi, supra note 41, at 171 ("[T]his is probably the strongest constraint on [customary
international law]: for a [customary international law] claim to be effective, it must actually resonate
with other actors. Others must be willing to treat the claim as law.").
331. See Laurence R. Helfer & Ingrid B. Wuerth, Customary International Law: An Instrument
Choice Perspective, 37 MICH. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 6),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2677300 (providing contemporary examples of situations where "states prefer
custom to treaties or soft law based on either its substantive norms or design features").
332. See Part IIl.8.4.
333. Cf Charney, supra note 16. Consent theorists rely on the persistent objector doctrine to
address this contradiction, but it does not operate effectively in practice. See Helfer & Wuerth, supra
note 331, at 7-8.
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international law is nonnegotiated, which means its norms are not subject to the
bargains that undercut the original aims of treaty provisions, domestic
legislation, and written soft law. 334 Accordingly, a state might prefer that the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention develop as a universally binding,
nonnegotiated customary rule than through treaty law or even soft law. 335
Alternatively, states might actually wish to be constrained from actingor even emphasize that a new customary norm has not developed. It is possible
that, notwithstanding a likely good-faith interest in dissuading Assad from
engaging in future indiscriminate attacks, the United States might actually not
have wanted to recognize a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention.
Consider recent history: less than a year after the resolution of the Syrian
situation, Russia deployed troops into the Crimean peninsula, ostensibly as a
"humanitarian intervention" to protect ethnic Russians in Crimea. 336 Despite his
passionate New York Times op-ed, 337 President Putin's defense of the action
was "eerily similar to the arguments made by other world leaders for a
humanitarian intervention to stop the Syrian Civil War," lending credence to
the longstanding concern that a doctrine of humanitarian intervention
"inadvertently opens the door for an aggressive state to invade a weaker
neighbor under the pretext of stopping a 'humanitarian crisis. "' 338 In some
cases, such as with regard to Article 2(4), treaty modification may not be
desirable. 339

*****
A state wishing to take action in apparent violation of its multilateral
treaty obligations has limited options. Even were it politically feasible, formal
amendment and treaty supersession procedures would likely take too long to be
useful. Absent that, a state that wishes to act, but act lawfully, is left with a
choice between advancing an adaptive interpretation and claiming that the
treaty has already been modified by subsequently developed customary
international law.
While, doctrinally, adaptive interpretations might appear more in keeping
with treaty law's grounding in consent, in practice the high bar for its
legitimacy-the consent of all states parties-actually encourages states to act
on unilateral (and possibly illegitimate) interpretations. Meanwhile,
notwithstanding the fact that customary international law can arise and modify
a treaty without universal state party consent, states wishing to build their
334. Helfer & Wuerth, supra note 331, at 11.
335. Id. at 31, 33-35.
336. See, e.g., Harriet Torry & Bertrand Bertrand Benoit, Watchdog Sees No Threat to Ethnic
Russians, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2014, at AI0.
337. Putin, supra note 305.
338. Shane Reeves & Winston Williams, The Road from Syria to Ukraine, 19 ASIL INSIGHTS
(JUL. 21, 2015), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/l 9/issue/l 6/road-syria-ukraine. But see Ryan
Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. lNT'L L. 107, 107 (2006)
(drawing on empirical studies to "contend that legalizing [unilateral humanitarian intervention] should in
important respects discourage wars with ulterior motives").
339. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Op-Ed, On Syria, A U.N. Vote lsn 't
Optional, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2013, at A23.
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arguments around the existence of contrary customary international law are
incentivized to engage in cooperative, coalition-building action. Thus,
somewhat counterintuitively, arguments based on modification by subsequently
developed customary international law may be less destabilizing and spur states
to show greater respect for the consensus of the international community.
CONCLUSION

Structural elements of the modem international order increase the
likelihood that provisions in multilateral treaties will conflict with subsequently
developed customary international law. Amendment, treaty supersession, and
the use of additional protocols have long been accepted formal means of
updating outdated treaties. However, as these strategies require the explicit
consent of all or a majority of states parties, they are of limited use in updating
outdated multilateral treaty regimes.
When modification by explicit mutual consent is not an option, adaptive
interpretation provides an alternative method of reconciling aging treaty text
and subsequent contradictory state action. But while adaptive interpretation can
resolve many problems between static texts and subsequent state conduct, it too
is limited by the need for state party consent. Nor are words infinitely elastic.
As new norms become widely accepted, certain inflexible treaty obligations
will appear progressively more absurd or impractical-and proposed
interpretations attempting to resolve stark discrepancies between treaty law and
state action will appear less plausible and convincing.
Despite much scholarly focus on how treaties might be legitimately
updated, surprisingly little attention has been paid to an alternative route of
treaty evolution: modification by subsequently developed customary
international law. This Article demonstrates that such modification occurs;
argues for recognition of its legitimacy as lex posterior; and highlights how,
when used as a justification for an action apparently in conflict with a treaty
obligation, it may result in more consensus-respecting conduct than arguments
grounded in traditional, consent-based forms of treaty modification.

